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  Abstract 
 
In this work we investigate the relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and 
profit shifting. First, we employ worldwide data for parent firms and their foreign subsidiaries to 
derive a profit shifting measure. Then, drawing on legitimacy theory and risk-management 
strategy, we find corporate social responsibility to be positively correlated with profit shifting. In 
addition, we find this relationship to be stronger in parent firms in countries under the territorial 
tax system. We perform a battery of sensitivity tests and robustness checks to corroborate our 
findings. By and large, our results suggest that multinational firms with higher CSR scores shift 
larger amounts of profits to their low-tax foreign subsidiaries, potentially indicating strategic 
planning in the choice of CSR investments by multinational enterprises.        
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1 Introduction  
“Big multinationals are paying significantly lower tax rates than 
before the 2008 financial crisis, according to Financial Times 
analysis showing that a decade of government efforts to cut deficits 
and reform taxes has left the corporate world largely unscathed.” 
(Toplensky, 2018). 
 
This article in the Financial Times sparks once again the contentious debate regarding 
multinational enterprises’ (MNEs) propensity to avoid paying taxes in their host countries. 
Consequently, this has put the public attention on such firms and their adopted tax planning 
strategies. Such a strategy is that of profit shifting—the tendency of some firms to move profits 
from the host country, where corporate taxes are higher, to a country with lower taxation. This 
phenomenon is expanding rapidly owing to accelerated globalization and tax differences across 
the world. To this end, some politicians have called for a minimum corporate tax rate to deter 
MNEs from moving their profits to tax heavens.1 The reason for this is that profit shifting activities 
decrease tax revenue, erode the tax base of high tax economies, and decrease the competition in 
the local market. This could lead to lower government expenditures and lower consumption 
overall.  
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has seen a rise across the globe since the 1960’s, 
whereby a number of firms have steadily started to increase their investments in CSR activities, 
either due to planned strategies or due to pressure from their shareholders. Contrary to the view of 
Friedman (1970), who states that the sole responsibility of firms is to increase their profits and 
value, other researchers claim that firms may participate in beneficial activities that increase 
stakeholders’ welfare. The argument here is that well-governed firms are more likely to follow 
                                                 
1 See Escritt (2018) for a discussion regarding the relevant statements from the German minister of finance, Olaf 
Scholz. 
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socially responsible paths (i.e., good governance view), whereby firm value maximization takes 
into consideration stakeholders too (Deng et al., 2013). Hence, an interesting question one asks is 
why some firms choose to be socially responsible, while others choose to be solely profit 
maximizers (Liang and Renneboog, 2017).   
MNEs have a number of different strategies at their disposal to tax avoid; some of them 
take place within the same country, while others between different countries—in this case we have 
profit-shifting.2 In this work, we study the relationship between CSR and profit shifting, which we 
view as a pristine area of research for accounting, finance, and management literatures. In doing 
so, we follow the suggestions of Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) and Sikka (2010), who stress the 
need to investigate the relationship between CSR and tax avoidance. Prior work in this area of 
research is limited by the use of single country data that make it extremely difficult to perform 
causality tests (e.g., Lanis and Richardson, 2012; Hoi et al., 2013; Watson, 2015; Davis et al., 
2016).  
Research so far has studied tax avoidance practices of firms (local and multinational), 
within the narrow borders of a country (within-country). In this work, we study a very specific 
form of tax avoidance, profit shifting, which is only observed for MNEs with subsidiaries in 
countries overseas (across countries). Profit-shifting severs tax revenues for economies with high 
corporate taxation, and for this reason it has drawn the attention of many scholars worldwide. First, 
profit shifting erodes the tax base of high-tax economies—taxable income leaves the country to be 
taxed in other jurisdictions with lower taxation. Second, it provides an unfair competition 
advantage for the MNEs, which could impair competition between firms and decrease welfare in 
the country where the MNE is headquartered. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first 
                                                 
2 For a thorough review regarding the local (within-country) tax avoidance and international (across countries) profit 
shifting see Beuselinck and Pierk (2018). 
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large-scale international study that examines exclusively the relationship between CSR and profit 
shifting, a practice that occurs for MNEs with international subsidiaries. By specifically studying 
the relationship between CSR and profit shifting, we add to our understanding of the tax planning 
strategies of MNEs. We view this as the natural continuation in this area of research.  
Utilizing accounting data with a worldwide coverage, we determine the level of profit 
shifting for MNEs using a difference-in-differences (DiD) method developed by Dharmapala and 
Riedel (2013). The advantage of this method is that it allows us to create an exogenous measure 
of profit shifting.  After we calculate profit shifting for each firm, we proceed to our main analysis, 
which aims at disentangling the relationship between CSR and profit shifting for MNEs. To do so, 
we employ a battery of different econometric techniques and sensitivity tests to corroborate our 
findings.    
 The causal and qualitative relationship between CSR and profit shifting is not obvious. 
Thus, we need to deal with a number of issues in order to obtain unbiased estimates. The first issue 
is that of reverse causality. The second, and perhaps more severe, is that of omitted variables. A 
potential third problem in our analysis is that of selection bias. That is, a group of firms, in a non-
random manner, are more willing to invest in CSR activities compared to the rest. We deal with 
the problem of reverse causality by estimating the profit shifting values of each firm based on 
exogenous industry shocks. By doing so, we obtain an exogenous measure for profit shifting. We 
deal with the second problem by borrowing insights from the legitimacy theory. Specifically, we 
conjecture that firms will want to strategically increase their legitimacy in order to avoid scrutiny 
(e.g., by the government and the public) and to be affected less severely in the light of corporate 
scandals or corporate misbehavior towards stakeholders. To this end, we study one direction of 
causality, that from CSR to profit shifting using two sets of instrumental variables. First, following 
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Liang and Renneboog (2017), we use legal origins as an instrument for CSR, as the authors have 
found firms from Civil Law countries to demonstrate higher CSR scores.3 The second instrument 
we use is that of industry peer’s average CSR scores (e.g., Laeven and Levine, 2009; Lin et al. 
2011; Ferrell et al. 2016). As for the third issue, we implement an endogenous treatment-regression 
model where we utilize legal origins as the exclusion restriction—this scheme is similar to that of 
Doidge et al. (2007), although the authors’ scope is different from ours.  
 We develop two different hypotheses. Our first hypothesis draws on legitimacy theory and 
risk-management strategy. Specifically, firms may disclose information (e.g., annual reports) to 
the press (or other media) to alleviate any concerns the public might have regarding the firm’s 
commitment to enhance societal welfare. Hence, such corporate actions could be signaling that 
firms care not only about their shareholders, but also their stakeholders. Having built this “moral 
capital” within the corporate world and in society, firms participating in unethical activities—for 
our case, this is profit-shifting activities, —might be “punished” less severely by people (e.g., 
customers) and government alike. Recent literature points to this direction (e.g., Janney and Gove; 
Hong and Liskovich, 2016), as it finds that firms with higher CSR scores face fewer penalties. 
In our second hypothesis, we want to investigate whether the effect CSR has on profit 
shifting differs according to the corporate tax system. Prior literature finds that multinationals 
under the territorial tax system shift more income compared to those under the worldwide tax 
scheme (e.g., Scholes et al, 2015; Kohlhase and Pierk, 2016; Markle, 2016). In our framework, we 
expect CSR to have a larger impact for parent firms that are more incentivized to participate in 
profit shifting activities (i.e., those under the territorial tax system).  
                                                 
3 Albuquerque et al. (forthcoming) notice also the endogeneity of the CSR variable. For example, a firm’s financial 
resources may affect CSR decisions. Using data for the United States, they deal with this issue by instrumenting CSR 
using the political affiliation of the state a firm is headquartered. 
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 To test these hypotheses, we utilize data from Orbis, which provides us with accounting 
information for parent firms originating from 20 countries and their respective subsidiaries spread 
in different jurisdictions (i.e., 63 countries). Specifically, we use a sample of almost 27,000 firm-
year observations for the period 2009-2016 containing information for more than 500 unique 
parent firms and around 6,000 unique subsidiary firms. An additional advantage of using this 
period is the mitigation of any potential noise that would have otherwise reverberated in our data 
should we have included data from the financial crisis period. 
 Our analysis comprises two stages. In the first stage, we estimate our profit shifting 
measure at the subsidiary-year level following similar steps as those of Dharmapala and Riedel 
(2013). The advantage of this method is that it uses a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach 
utilizing shocks at the industry level for comparable parent firms.4 For the purposes of our work, 
this is of utmost importance, since the measure of profit shifting we obtain is exogenous and free 
from endogeneity issues. Having found a measure for profit shifting, we proceed in the second 
stage, whereby we focus on the relationship between CSR and profit shifting. We utilize several 
econometric models and we apply sensitivity and robustness tests to corroborate our findings. Our 
main specification indicates a positive and statistically significant relationship between CSR and 
profit shifting, thus being in accordance with our first hypothesis. We also find that the effect of 
CSR on profit shifting is larger for parent firms under the territorial tax system, thus providing 
evidence in favor of our second hypothesis.  
We introduce a number of important contributions in the field. First, our work combines 
two different strands of literature. One that studies tax aggressiveness and another one that 
investigates corporate social responsibility. Second, we extend the significant contributions made 
                                                 
4 We follow Bertrand et al. (2002) and set comparable parent firms to be those belonging to the same industry and 
country. 
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by Hoi et al. (2013) and Davis et al. (2016) by utilizing firm data at the global level, but most 
importantly, by focusing on a specific form of tax planning strategy for MNE’s, that of profit 
shifting. In fact, this is the first paper that explicitly studies the causal relationship of CSR and 
profit shifting accounting for the endogenous firm decision regarding the range of CSR investment 
and the selectivity issue of that choice. Using legal origins as an exclusion restriction, the paper 
finds a strong positive relationship between CSR and profit shifting. The magnitude of this effect 
is higher for firms that have headquarters in countries under the territorial tax system, thus 
indicating the importance of the multi-country setting in studying tax aggressiveness. 
Furthermore, we envisage this work to act as a fruitful terrain for future research. Being 
the first to study the relationship between CSR and profit shifting, we have utilized the most 
detailed databases available to us at the moment. However, we are aware that even more 
sophisticated data will be a certainty in the future, especially given the big data revolution. We 
strongly believe that detailed corporate data for more companies around the world, along with 
more advanced techniques to capture profit shifting, will assist scholars in understanding the 
mechanisms that connect CSR and profit shifting. We trust that future researchers will take 
advantage of the oncoming advancements and shed more light in the questions we ask here.    
The remainder of this paper proceeds along the following lines. In section 2, we review the 
relevant literature and develop our testable hypotheses. Section 3 discusses our research design 
along with the steps required to measure profit shifting. In section 4, we discuss the main findings 
of this study, while in section 5 we analyze the process we follow to deal with endogeneity and 
selectivity. Finally, we conclude in section 6.  
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2 Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1 Literature review 
2.1.1 Profit shifting  
The dawn of the 21st century saw an increasing integration of foreign markets, where MNEs 
constitute a key player of the global economy. As documented by Dharmapala and Riedel (2013), 
foreign direct investments have overtaken economic growth in the last decades, indicating their 
crucial role in modern economies. What is important to notice, nonetheless, is that although 
globalization has tied economies together, there are still differences in corporate taxation across 
countries that incentivize firms to reallocate their profits.  
One of the most influential works regarding profit shifting activities is that of Hines and 
Rice (1994). By firstly developing the tax differential approach, they find that a large portion of 
U.S. firms move their foreign profits to tax heavens. In a similar manner, Collins et al. (1998) 
argue that U.S. MNEs prefer to shift their profits back home, when corporate taxation increases in 
countries overseas. Following Hines and Rice (1994) a number of efforts have been made to 
advance the empirical methods to identify profit shifting. Huizinga and Laeven (2008), based on 
the tax differential approach of Hines and Rice (1994), devise a new method to identify profit 
shifting among subsidiaries. They do so by constructing an index that incorporates weighted tax 
differences among all the affiliates of a MNEs’ group. The authors find that European countries 
are severely affected. More recently, Dharmapala and Riedel (2013) move on step further. Using 
exogenous industry shocks, they identify profit shifting through a difference-in-differences (DiD) 
method.5 
                                                 
5 For a review regarding taxes and corporate finance activities see Maydew (2001), Shackelford and Shevlin (2001), 
Graham (2003), and Hanlon and Heitzman (2010).    
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 Previous studies have determined the following profit-shifting spread mechanisms: (i) 
transfer pricing (e.g., Hines and Rice, 1994; Huizinga and Laeven, 2008), and (ii) debt shifting 
(e.g., Huizinga and Laeven, 2008; Dharmapala and Riedel, 2013). More recently, Dischinger and 
Riedel (2011) and Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) examine another channel of profit shifting, namely 
the relocation of intangible assets. They find that firms have incentives to locate intangible assets 
(e.g., patents, or brand names) to affiliates located in countries with lower corporate tax rates.    
There is a steadily growing literature studying the determinants of profit shifting. Klassen 
and Laplante (2012), using a U.S. sample, document that higher regulatory costs decrease profit 
shifting. Dyreng and Markle (2016) analyze the role of financial constraints and find that 
financially constrained MNEs are less likely to shift income from the U.S. to other countries 
compared to their unconstrained peers. Likewise, Markle (2016) studies the effect different tax 
systems (i.e., worldwide vs. territorial) have in firms' decisions to shift income in other countries. 
He finds that MNEs under the territorial tax system shift more income.  
For a firm to participate in profit shifting activities, two main components are required. 
First, firms need to have an international network of affiliates. Second, firms need to understand 
well the laws considering the reduction of taxes in the country of origin. These include, inter alia, 
court penalties, administration costs, transaction, and opportunity costs (Dyreng et al., 2016). 
Hence, not all firms will be able to participate in profit shifting activities. In addition, even among 
these firms with profit shifting activities, we expect a considerable level of heterogeneity. This 
may be due to agency problems, or differences in managerial skills and governance, among others. 
In addition, there is complexity regarding the assets that a firm may choose to shift profits.       
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2.1.2 Corporate social responsibility 
Corporate finance tradition states that corporations exist to maximize shareholder value (Berle and 
Means, 1932). To this end, one would expect that corporate social responsibility actions avail the 
firm. However, the impact CSR has on the firm is far from obvious. As Ferrell et al (2016) aptly 
put it, there are two main views regarding CSR. The first is the good governance view, stating that 
socially responsible firms can follow value-maximizing practices (e.g., Edmans, 2011; Deng et al., 
2013). The second is the agency view, which states that the desire of some firms to participate in 
CSR activities is an indicator of agency problems (e.g., Bénabou and Tirole, 2010; Masulis and 
Reza, 2015).  
Corporate social responsibility is also related to board structure and CEO behavior. 
Specifically, McGuinness et al. (2017), using Chinese data, find that greater gender balance 
increases CSR scores, while McCarthy et al. (2017) argue that higher CSR scores are related to 
lower CEO confidence. Likewise, Yuan et al. (2017) document that CSR increases with CEO 
ability. A reason for this could be that better CEOs have already peaked in their careers and are 
willing to undertake activities that are beneficial for the society.  Importantly, the view analysts 
have about CSR appears to have changed in the passage of time. For example, Ioannou and 
Serafeim (2015) document that analysts in the 90’s viewed CSR as an agency cost and for this 
reason they made pessimistic recommendations for those firms with high CSR scores. 
Nonetheless, with the passage of time, it appears that analysts—especially the high-ranked ones—
changed their mind in favor of a positive opinion about CSR. 
 Past research documents that disclosure practices (among them CSR) exert a positive effect 
in firm valuation (Durnev and Kim, 2005). To this end, corporate social responsibility has emerged 
to be an important parameter for the modern firm. This is because CSR activities could be 
10 
 
perceived as optimal firm choices, or strategies against competition. In a recent paper Cao et al. 
(forthcoming) find that peer firms increase their CSR activities when an opponent has done so. 
More importantly, they find that laggard firms (those who do not invest in CRS activities) 
experience lower stock returns. In addition, firms’ participation in CSR activities acts as a 
signaling tool for product differentiation (Albuquerque et al., forthcoming), indicating that the 
products of firms with higher CSR scores are supposed to be of higher quality.    
 A country’s development could potentially affect a firm’s choices. For example, 
institutions and the strength of the legal regime of a country are important factors regarding the 
effect of disclosure practices. For example, Durnev and Kim (2005) find that the positive 
relationship between disclosure practices and firm valuation is stronger in less investor friendly 
countries because disclosure practices are scarcer there. Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) argue that 
the political, labor, education, and cultural system seem to affect corporate social performance. 
One should expect this, since societies—and people therein—demand more as they become 
wealthier  
 Agency costs are important parameters of firm performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1974; 
McGuire et al., 1988; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). Among others, 
higher agency costs could jeopardize a firm’s access to finance. In a recent paper, Cheng et al. 
(2014) document that firms with higher CSR scores are more likely to have access to financial 
intermediaries, indicating a potential decrease in agency costs when participating in CSR activities. 
The importance of CSR is more pronounced in periods of economic distress. For example, Lins et 
al. (2017) document that during the financial crisis of 2008-2009 firms with higher CSR scores 
had higher returns and experienced higher profitability and growth compared to firms with low 
CSR scores.  Likewise, El Ghoul et al. (2011) find that firms with better CSR scores face lower 
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cost of equity. In the same spirit, Goss and Roberts (2011) argue that more responsible firms pay 
up to 18 base points less to bank loans compared to firms with social responsibility concerns. 
Furthermore, Flammer (2015) and Hasan et al. (2018) document that the adoption of CSR practices 
increases firm value through increased labor productivity. Finally, Nelling and Webb (2009) in a 
time series analysis find the relationship between CSR and firm performance to be weaker, while 
McWilliams and Siegel (2000) find that CSR has a neutral effect on a firm financial performance 
once accounting for R&D investments.6 
 
2.2 Hypothesis development 
As stated above, social responsibility has become a crucial component for the modern firm, so 
much so that (large) corporations spend vast amounts of money on it. Nonetheless, such actions 
are not required by any law (McWilliams and Siegel, 2000). The main reason for this is the belief 
that such “good actions” promote the status of the firm and strengthen its ties with citizens. In that 
aspect, CSR activities are strategies firms use to advertise goodwill and they could be perceived 
as acts of buying respect from stakeholders. Hence, these altruistic activities act as signals that 
avail the firm by spreading “good” information about it to the society, thus reducing search and 
evaluation costs (Kennet, 1980). 
 Paying taxes and investing in CSR activities could be considered as a diversion of resources 
from shareholders towards stakeholders. Past research has distinguished two main channels 
regarding the relationship between CSR and tax aggressiveness. The first channel draws on the 
idea that if firms take into consideration all stakeholders, they should participate in activities that 
                                                 
6 For a review regarding the relationship between CSR and firm performance see Cochran and Wood (1984), Chatterji 
and Toffel (2010), and more recently Krüger (2015). 
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increase common good; that is, actions that do not necessarily maximize profits (Mackey et al., 
2007). In such occasions, the relationship between CSR and tax aggressiveness is expected to be 
negative. The second channel documents a positive relationship between CSR and tax 
aggressiveness. Firms strategically participate in CSR activities—thus, increasing their CSR 
scores—in order to suffer fewer losses in cases where corporate scandals erupt. Based on the above 
we formalize our first hypothesis in the following manner: 
Hypothesis 1: Firms that intend to participate in profit shifting activities will exhibit higher 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) scores, in order to appease the negative effects of a 
potential corporate scandal. They do so by improving their legitimacy and reducing their 
risk through higher CSR scores. 
Hypothesis 1 is partially related to legitimacy theory, which states that when a firm’s goals 
differ from those of the public, a firm’s management would disclose information about the 
company (e.g., through annual reports) to alleviate further concerns the public might have about 
its actions (Hurst, 1970; Gray et al., 1995; Lanis and Richardson, 2012). As argued in Godfrey et 
al. (2009), firms’ participation in CSR activities shows that the latter cares about its stakeholders. 
When a firm succeeds in transmitting such signals to its stakeholders and [they] accept them, then 
a firm builds a “moral capital” within the society that may have positive effects on the firm (Simon, 
1995). For example, Janney and Gove (2011) find that firms with higher reputation due to CSR 
activities are affected less in the event of corporate scandals. In the same spirit, Hong and 
Liskovich (2016) find similar results. Hence, in this situation firms acting rationally, use the CSR 
façade to soothe potential negative effects, such as fraud or scandals (e.g., Fombrun et al., 2000; 
Godfrey at al., 2009). 
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Our next task is to examine the magnitude CSR has on profit shifting by taking into 
consideration different tax systems. Specifically, countries under the worldwide tax system impose 
taxes to any income earned by its nationals either within the country or overseas, while countries 
under the territorial regime exempt income earned overseas.7 Prior literature finds that 
multinationals under the territorial tax system shift more income compared to those under the 
worldwide tax scheme (e.g., Scholes et al, 2015; Kohlhase and Pierk, 2016; Markle, 2016). Hence, 
if the incentives for profit shifting are higher in multinationals under the territorial tax scheme, we 
should expect the effect of CSR on profit shifting for these firms to be larger. We formulate the 
above in the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between CSR and profit shifting should be stronger for 
parent companies under the territorial tax system and weaker for parent companies under 
the worldwide tax system. 
3 Data and methodology 
3.1 Data 
For our empirical analysis we require accounting information for multinational corporations, 
which we obtain from Orbis. Our final sample consists of 26,752 observations for the period 2009-
2016. This includes 509 unique parent companies and 6,103 unique subsidiary companies. As 
shown in Appendices A1 and A2, parent companies originate from 20 countries, including many 
OECD countries and China, while subsidiary companies from 63. The second major component 
of our empirical analysis is information regarding corporate social responsibility. These data are 
drawn from the Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database. 
                                                 
7 Countries with a worldwide taxation system are: Chile, Greece, Ireland, Israel, South Korea, Mexico, Poland, and 
the United States.  
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 By inspecting appendix tables A1 and A2, we notice that there are quite a few differences 
regarding the metrics of CSR activities and profit shifting. For subsidiary companies (Table A1), 
we see that profit shifting spans from a minimum of zero (e.g., United States) to a maximum of 
0.509 (Canada). This comes as no surprise, if we consider that corporate taxation is quite high in 
the United States and, thus, MNEs would not consider moving income there. Furthermore, 
regarding CSR scores, we see former communist countries demonstrating lower CSR scores, while 
Western-type societies having among the highest scores.8 These results are in accordance with 
Liang and Renneboog (2017) further adding credit to our analysis. On the other hand, for the case 
of parent companies (Table A2), we observe that the highest levels of profit shifting occur for 
countries with relatively higher corporate taxation, such as the United States, Belgium, Italy, 
Germany, and Denmark, while for companies with their jurisdiction in countries with very low 
corporate taxation we see no such effect (i.e., Ireland).  
 We provide definitions of the variables used in our analysis along with their sources in 
Table 1 and correlations for the main variables used in our econometric models in appendix Table 
A4.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 Summary statistics are reported in Table 2. Notice that the number of observations reported 
in Table 2 does not directly match that of the tables of our main specifications. The reason for this 
is that we decided to use all available information from Orbis to estimate profit shifting and some 
observations were dropped when we merged data with ASSET4. Further examination of Table 2, 
                                                 
8 Appendix Table A3 indicates that average CSR scores and profit shifting have changed in time. Average CSR scores 
were at their lowest level in 2009, while they started increasing afterwards. One reason for such a drastic change could 
be the financial crisis of 2007/2008 that affected many firms around the world. A potential explanation for this is that 
firms might not have had the necessary funds to invest in CSR objectives. Interestingly, one might notice that our 
profit shifting measure is the highest in 2009, perhaps indicating firms trying to decrease as much as possible the 
losses they incurred during the financial crisis through profit shifting activities.   
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indicates that about 61% of observations originate from a country with a territorial tax system, 
while about 73% of subsidiaries are based in countries with lower corporate taxation, as opposed 
to that of parent companies. Parent companies tend to be rather large. The mean value of their 
pretax profits is about $1.10 billion, while their total assets around $19.8 billion. However, parent 
profits and total assets present a wide range of values spanning from $3.8 million to $57 billion 
for profits and $623 million to almost $500 billion for assets. Subsidiary companies are smaller; 
for example, the average subsidiary company has a mean value of pretax profits of about $14 
million with assets around $38 million. Parent companies present a number of heterogeneities 
regarding the number of subsidiaries they have around the world. The countries where parent 
companies are more likely to have a subsidiary are Great Britain, France, Germany, Spain, China, 
Italy, and Belgium. Not surprisingly, most parent companies are from the United States, Great 
Britain, Germany, France, and Spain. On average, the number of subsidiaries per firm is 11.81. In 
absolute terms, the U.S. dominate the market of subsidiaries, as they have 2,116 firms in our 
sample. In the second position is France, which although it has only 35 parent companies, it enters 
with a total of 1,149 subsidiaries in our sample—this means 33 subsidiaries per each parent 
company (see Appendix tables A1 and A2). 
 [Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
3.2 First-stage: Estimation of profit shifting  
The aim of this work is to study the inter-relationship between corporate social responsibility and 
profit shifting. In doing so, we need to firstly identify profit-shifting flows for parent-subsidiary 
pairs. The idea behind this is that parent companies will shift income to their affiliates due to 
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corporate tax differentials, inter alia. The process analyzed below closely follows the scheme 
implemented in Dharmapala and Riedel (2013).  
 We use a difference-in-differences approach (DiD) to estimate tax-motivated profit 
shifting. This identification method lies on utilizing the impact of exogenous shocks to a parent’s 
pretax and pre-shifting profit,  ?̃?𝑝𝑡 on subsidiaries in low tax countries. For the purposes of this 
approach, subsidiaries in low-tax countries belong to the treatment group, while subsidiaries in 
high-tax countries the control-group. The hypothesis is that an increase in the pre-tax and pre-
shifting profits of a parent company, would increase the pretax profits of a subsidiary firm located 
in a country with lower taxes, as opposed to countries where taxation is higher.  
 In mathematical terms, our model has the following form:  
log 𝜋𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛽1 log 𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 log ?̃?𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑑𝑖𝑡 ⋅ log ?̃?𝑝𝑡) + 𝛽4𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡. (1) 
In the above equation, 𝑑𝑖𝑡 is an indicator variable taking value one for subsidiaries located in 
countries with lower taxation than parent firms. Additional controls include a subsidiary’s size, 
𝑎𝑖𝑡, and debt exposure, 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡. Likewise, 𝜌𝑖𝑡 is a set of fixed effects, such as subsidiary fixed 
effects, year fixed effects, industry-year fixed effects, and country-year fixed effects. Finally, 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
is the error term.9 
 The process of constructing  ?̃?𝑝𝑡 is based on the insights of Bertrand et al. (2002). 
Specifically, we set the following system of equations: 
?̃?𝑝𝑡 = 𝑝𝑝𝑡 × 𝑎𝑝𝑡,  (2) 
𝑝𝑝𝑡 = ∑
𝛼𝑗𝑡
∑ 𝑎𝑗𝑡𝑗
× 𝑝𝑗𝑡, 𝑝 ≠ 𝑗, ∀ 𝑡 ∈ {1, … , 𝑇}.𝑗   (3) 
                                                 
9 For the estimation of profit shifting, we also incorporate information about the subsidiary country’s population and 
GDP per capita, as these are important indicators that take into account many dimensions of a country’s economy. 
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In the above equations, 𝑎𝑝𝑡 denotes the total assets of the parent company 𝑝 affiliated with a 
subsidiary firm 𝑖. Noting that subscript 𝑗 denotes comparable parent firms, we set 𝑝𝑗𝑡 =
𝜋𝑗𝑡
𝑎𝑗𝑡
 to be 
the ratio of pretax profit over total assets for the comparable firm. Importantly, the instrument we 
use,  ?̃?𝑝𝑡, is the product of the average industry profitability ratio ( 𝑝𝑝𝑡) with the total assets of the 
parent company (𝑎𝑝𝑡). To this end, by estimating equation (1) we obtain profit-shifting estimates 
at the firm-year level. Bear in mind, however, that although we possess information about the 
actual parent earnings, to ensure shock exogeneity we need to utilize  ?̃?𝑝𝑡. Another important point 
is that we employ shocks from comparable firms (instead of parent companies) to deal with reverse 
causality. 
 Based on parent firm 𝑝, we characterize (other) firms to be comparable when they belong 
to the same industry (i.e., have the same four-digit NACE codes) and country. Next, we take all 
national and multinational firms from Orbis for which we have available information regarding 
profits and total assets. For the statistical analysis that follows, we require only subsidiary-year 
combinations when the set of comparable firms is at least 20 firms—we do this to increase 
accuracy—and subsidiaries and parent companies differ at a four-digit NACE codes—so that 
industry shocks do not drive subsidiaries’ pretax profits. 
 If our hypothesis about tax-motivated profit shifting is correct, we expect a positive sign 
for  ?̂?3. That is, when a positive income shock occurs in the parent company, we expect profit to 
shift from a parent company located in a country with higher corporate taxation to a subsidiary 
located in a country with lower corporate taxation, ceteris paribus. 
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3.3 First stage results  
Results about the estimation of profit shifting are found in Table 3. Columns in Table 3 differ in 
the way they incorporate fixed effects. Column (4), for example, is the most restrictive case, as it 
incorporates many fixed effects. The coefficient of interest is that of the interaction term, Low (x) 
Parent profits. In all specifications this is positive and statistically significant with a value around 
0.03. This indicates that a 10% increase in parent’s earnings is followed by 0.3% higher EBT for 
low tax subsidiaries. Given that our sample has an EBT mean of about $14.12 million, the 
coefficient for the interaction term indicates that a 10% increase in parent’s earnings results in an 
increase in profit shifting of about $42,360 (i.e., 0.3*14.12) per subsidiary. Given that in our 
sample the average number of subsidiaries is 12, profit shifting is on average around $508,320. 
For parent firms, which on average have more subsidiaries, this number increases considerably. 
For example, for the case of France, where the average parent company has 33 subsidiaries, the 
total amount of profit shifting is close to $1.4 million.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Based on  ?̂?3 coefficient, we calculate the partial fitted values by subsidiary-year. This is the 
measure of profit shifting (𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑡) we use in the rest of our analysis.
10   
 
3.4 Second-stage: The effect of CSR on profit shifting 
In the same spirit as Davis et al. (2016), to study the relationship between CSR and profit shifting, 
we use the following regression equation: 
𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝜉 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (4) 
                                                 
10 Partial fitted values are equal to: ?̂?3(𝑑𝑖𝑡 ⋅ ?̃?𝑝𝑡). 
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In equation (4), 𝑝𝑠 denotes profit shifting values for a specific parent company at a specific year.11 
𝐶𝑆𝑅 is the parent’s composite index of corporate social responsibility. A vector with subsidiary-
year and parent-year control variables is denoted by ℎ, while 𝜉 represents a number of different 
fixed effects. Finally, 𝑢 is the error term. 
We include several control variables that past literature has shown to affect tax 
aggressiveness, such as total assets, leverage, return on assets, the ratio of fixed assets to total 
assets, and R&D expenditures over total assets for both parent and subsidiary companies. Our 
specifications include a rich set of fixed effects and their interactions that help us capture various 
unobserved heterogeneities at the firm, industry, and time dimensions. 
 We collect firm-level CSR data from the Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database. Prior to 
being acquired by Thomson Reuters in 2009, ASSET4 was a Swiss company specializing in 
gathering objective and quantifiable company ESG data from publicly available information 
sources. For each firm, a specially-trained team of experts manually collects more than 900 data 
points relating to its environmental, social, governance, and economic performance. These data 
points are then used as inputs to construct 250 key performance indicators, further organized into 
18 categories, and more broadly, into four pillars: (1) Environmental Score; (2) Social Scores; (3) 
Governance Scores; and (4) Economic Scores. For each of the four dimensions, a firm’s pillar 
score in a given year is a standardized z-score and thus captures its relative performance against 
all other firms in the universe of ASSET4. Following Cheng et al. (2014), a firm’s CSR 
performance is measured as the average of the Environmental Score, Social Scores, and 
Governance Scores. Since it is unclear a priori as to what the relative weights should be, we follow 
                                                 
11 We use three different measures of profit shifting in our analysis. See Table 1 for more information. 
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the convention in the prior literature (e.g., Waddock and Graves (1997), Hillman and Keim (2001), 
Waldman et al. (2006), and Cheng et al., 2014) and assign equal importance to the three pillars. 
 
4  Results  
4.1 Inference from univariate analysis 
We start with a graphical representation of the relationship between corporate social responsibility 
and profit shifting in Figure 1. The average values (at a country level) of CSR index and profit 
shifting measure demonstrate a positive relationship. Firms from countries with higher levels of 
CSR scores appear to have higher profit shifting. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 We proceed by documenting results from a univariate analysis. Specifically, using the 
median value of the CSR score, we categorize firms as high and low-CSR. The results in Table 4 
show that variable differences between the two groups are statistically significant. Respectively, 
subsidiary firms related to parent firms with high CSR values, demonstrate higher pre-tax profits 
of about $1.1 million ($3.8 million vs. $2.7 million), they are more likely to have subsidiaries in 
countries with lower corporate taxation (76% vs. 70%), and higher profits (the difference is about 
$1 billion dollars). Furthermore, parent firms with higher CSR scores show higher levels of profit 
shifting—in our profit shifting measure 0.330 against 0.280.12 This outcome supports what it was 
shown graphically in Figure 1. That is, a clear positive relationship between CSR and profit 
shifting. Moreover, high CSR parent companies have larger asset tangibility, compared to 
subsidiary companies, where the opposite holds.  
                                                 
12 Companies with high CSR scores, show also larger values for the two other proxies we use for profit shifting.  
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[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
4.2 Inference from multivariate analysis 
Results of our baseline model are found in Table 5. We start with a simple specification where we 
include only our main control variable (CSR) and a plethora of fixed effects. Specifically, parent 
fixed effects, parent industry-year fixed effects, parent country-year fixed effects, subsidiary 
industry-year fixed effects, and subsidiary country-year fixed effects. By doing so, we obtain a 
quite high 𝑅2 of 74.2%. We then start progressively adding controls for parent and subsidiary 
firms.13  
 The results for the CSR measure indicate a positive and statistically significant relationship. 
In turn, this means that parent firms with higher CSR scores exhibit higher profit shifting. For 
example, based on the last model presented in column 4, we find a coefficient of 0.024. This 
outcome indicates that a one unit increase in CSR measure, increases profit shifting by 2.4 
percentage points, or alternatively, by moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of CSR we obtain 
an increase of profit shifting of equal to 0.5 percentage points.14 Hence, the results we obtain 
support our first hypothesis. That is, firms care about their image and because potential revelations 
of profit shifting might hurt their value in multiple ways, they have already strategically increased 
CSR, in order to face less severe punishment.15 Most importantly, our results are conceptually in 
line with those of Davis et al. (2016), although we examine a very specific tax planning activity, 
profit shifting.16  
                                                 
13 We repeat this analysis in Appendix Table A7, where instead of having our dependent variable and lagged (by one 
year) control variables, we use changes. The results are practically the same. 
14  The 75th and 25th percentile values for CSR are 0.886 and 0.672. Hence, the outcome for the interquartile difference 
is the result of the following calculation: (0.886 –  0.672) × 0.024 =  0.005. 
15 For empirical evidence regarding this mechanism see Hong and Liskovich (2016). 
16 The measure of profit shifting we construct is bounded to zero from below.  Hence, to deal with any problems of 
censoring, we perform a tobit regression. The results, found in Appendix Table A9, remain almost identical.  
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[Insert Table 5 about here] 
About 48% of parent companies in our sample are from the United States. For this reason, 
and as a robustness exercise, we test the same baseline specification without including U.S. parent 
companies. We do this to ensure that our results are not driven by the activities of U.S. firms. The 
results are in the Appendix Table A5. The results are qualitatively very similar. However, and 
perhaps more importantly, we see that the CSR coefficient we obtain now is larger in all 
specifications. We return to this finding with additional details when we discuss the effect of the 
different tax systems in profit shifting incentives.  
Next, we run several sensitivity tests to corroborate our main findings. Results of the above 
are in Table 6. Specifically, column (1) and column (2) include two different proxies of profit 
shifting obtained from specifications (2) and (3) of Table 3—the first one accounts for subsidiary 
and year fixed effects, while the second accounts for subsidiary and industry-year fixed effects. In 
column (3) we cluster standard errors at the parent level instead of the subsidiary level to deal with 
this specific form of heteroscedasticity, which could perhaps drive our results and provide wrong 
inference. Importantly, in order to address potential bias due to profit shifting measure carrying 
potential errors from the first stage, we perform a bootstrap estimation with 500 replications. In all 
these sensitivity tests, our control for corporate social responsibility is relatively unaffected. 
Finally, the last specification of Table 6 adds subsidiary fixed effects. The inclusion of subsidiary 
fixed effects increases the explanatory power of the model considerably, as 𝑅2 reaches almost 
94.4%. It is important to notice here that our main variable of interest, CSR, is still statistically 
significant, albeit the coefficient is somewhat smaller.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
23 
 
 Following the insights of Scholes et al. (2015), Kohlhase and Pierk (2016), and Markle 
(2016), we expect that parent firms located in countries under the territorial tax scheme, to be more 
tax aggressive—to shift more profit. The reason is that by doing so, they would be able to repatriate 
their profits without the obligation to pay any taxes to their government. Having found a positive 
association between CSR and profit shifting, we investigate whether the magnitude is larger for 
parent firms located in countries under the territorial tax regime. We test this in the following 
manner. First, we split the sample into worldwide vs. territorial-only countries. Second, in the 
pooled sample, we include the 𝐶𝑆𝑅 × 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 interaction term. This allows us to explore the 
cross-tax-system variation of CSR’s potency on profit shifting. The results we obtain are in 
accordance with our second hypothesis. Specifically, we find that higher CSR scores have a larger 
effect on firms from countries under the territorial tax system. By inspecting Table 7, we see the 
effect of CSR to be much lower for firms under the worldwide tax system vs. firms under the 
territorial tax system (0.05 for worldwide against 0.038 for territorial). Likewise, in the pooled 
sample, the interaction term 𝐶𝑆𝑅 × 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 is positive and statistically significant with a 
value of 0.04.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
In a robustness exercise (see Appending Table A6) we analyze the same question, but now 
our sample includes only U.S. firms and those belonging to the territorial tax system. The results 
are practically unchanged, owing to the fact that worldwide companies in our sample are mostly 
populated by U.S. firms, thus confirming once more our conjecture that territorial firms have 
higher incentives to participate in profit shifting activities.  
By and large, our results exhibit a weak association between CSR and profit shifting for parent 
firms located in countries under the worldwide tax system (which are expected to exhibit lower 
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profit shifting). To this end, our findings are the first to document that in the relationship between 
CSR and profit shifting (i.e., across-countries tax avoidance) one has to account the difference 
among different corporate tax systems. Past literature (e.g., Hoi et al., 2013; Watson, 2015; Davis 
et al., 2016) was not able to study the aforesaid, as it relied solely on U.S. data.  
 
5 Dealing with endogeneity and potential selectivity 
One important issue that emerges when studying corporate decisions is endogeneity and 
selectivity–a result of a firm’s choices. Endogeneity can be a consequence of reverse causality, 
omitted variables, and measurement error. Selectivity, in this setting, originates from firms 
choosing specific paths that might not be randomly selected, for example firms that more actively 
participate in CSR activities might differ from the rest in a specific pattern. In what follows, we 
exhibit several potential solutions to deal with the above issues.  
 
5.1 Reverse causality 
 First, we run several tests to show that the effect we obtain is more likely to run from CSR to 
profit shifting. Our first test is to estimate models where CSR is a dependent variable and the profit 
shifting measure is an explanatory variable. Should we find that the effect of profit shifting is 
insignificant, then the possibilities of reverse causality will be limited. 
 Table 8 reports the results. All models include the same controls used in our baseline 
analysis plus the profit shifting variable. By carefully inspecting the table and all its econometric 
specifications, one deduces that profit shifting does not have any effect on CSR scores, as the 
coefficients in all specifications are not only statistically insignificant, but their values are close to 
nil. These results should not come as a surprise, because the profit shifting measure is constructed 
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based on exogenous shocks of the industry where a firm operates, rather than its actual profit 
shifting activities.17  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
Insofar, we have relied on industry profitability ratios of peer companies to create our 
measure of profit shifting (see equations 1-3). To further strengthen our results and provide an 
evaluation of our measure of profit shifting, we run two additional robustness tests. In doing so, 
we check the sensitivity of our findings utilizing the true pre-tax parent earnings.18 The results of 
this test are reported in Table A10 and are qualitatively similar to those of Table 3. We then proceed 
by re-running our main econometric model—the effect of CSR on profit shifting (i.e., eq. 4).19 The 
results are in Table A11 and are qualitatively similar to our baseline specification found in Table 
5. A common pattern we observe in our findings is that the coefficients are quantitatively larger 
when we use the true pre-tax earnings of the parent company (𝜋𝑝𝑡 instead of ?̃?𝑝𝑡). The reason for 
this is that the coefficients are “inflated” due to endogeneity issues from reverse causality. In our 
main analysis, the use of ?̃?𝑝𝑡 constructed by industry profitability ratios, significantly mitigates 
these endogeneity concerns, as it is not a choice variable for the parent firm. However, this is not 
the case when we use the true pre-tax earnings of the parent company.   
 
5.2 Omitted variable bias and selection bias 
Having found that reverse causality is less likely to be an issue in our econometric analysis, we 
next proceed by employing an instrumental variables approach (IV) to deal with endogeneity due 
to omitted variables and a Heckman selection model to deal with selection.  
                                                 
17 We repeat this analysis using variable changes instead of levels. The results reported in Appendix Table A8 are very 
similar. 
18 We re-estimate profit shifting using equations 1-3, but this time we use 𝜋 instead of  ?̃?.  
19 In this case, profit shifting is calculated as  ?̂?3(𝑑𝑖𝑡 ⋅ 𝜋𝑝𝑡) instead of  ?̂?3(𝑑𝑖𝑡 ⋅ ?̃?𝑝𝑡).  
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 Regarding endogeneity, a good instrument is one which is not correlated with the main 
outcome variable but is correlated with the variable that is instrumented. In other words, our 
instrument should affect profit shifting only through CSR and not directly. To this end, we follow 
Liang and Renneboog (2017) and use the legal origins of a country as our instrumental variable.20 
However, instead of using all five different dummy variables for each legal system, we create a 
variable that takes value one for all countries under the French legal system and zero otherwise. 
One reason for doing this is that past literature has documented clear differences between French 
civil law compared to the rest. Another reason is because Liang and Renneboog (2017) find firms 
under the French legal system to have higher levels of CSR. Although this sample may look small, 
the inclusion of OECD countries, thus including many European countries, indicates that our final 
sample does a good job in representing the main legal origin families.  
 Past research has revealed that the role of legal origins in various socioeconomic 
phenomena and the corporate world is very important. From a historical perspective, there are two 
main families of legal origins: the Common law tradition and the Civil law tradition—the latter is 
multidimensional and manifested in many forms, such as the French, German, and Scandinavian 
civil laws. In the past two decades, scholars have quantified the effect legal origins have in a 
country’s rules and economic outcomes. Specifically, for the case of law and finance, theory 
suggests that the differences between legal origins play a crucial role in the development of the 
financial system of a country.21    
                                                 
20 Legal origins characterize the legal tradition of a country where a parent company is headquartered. La Porta et al. 
(1998) recognize the following law systems: English (E), French (F), Germanic (G), Scandinavian (Scand), and 
Socialist (S). Parent companies in our database are from the following countries: Austria (G), Australia (E), Belgium 
(F), Switzerland (G), China (S), Germany (G), Denmark (Scand), Spain (F), Finland (Scand), France(F), Great Britain 
(E), Hungary (S), Ireland (E), Israel (F), Italy (F), Netherlands (F), Norway (Scand), Poland (S), Sweden (Scand), 
United States (E).  
21 See La Porta et al. (2008) for a thorough review on the effects legal origins have in the economy and Beck and 
Levine (2005) on the effects of legal institutions in financial development.  
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 Evidently, legal origins are among the primary forces that shape contracts between 
different economic entities (e.g., between shareholders and stockholders). Although both “born” 
in Europe, the Civil and Common law have significant dissimilarities. An important difference lies 
on the way the state perceives private property. Some researchers have pointed out that Civil law 
tends to cultivate and feed a strong state that puts less emphasis on private property rights. In this 
case, a very strong state under the Civil law system is more likely to move resources towards the 
entities it prefers the most, thus giving space to corruption and other unlawful activities between 
government officials and citizens.  
 Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) provide a nice overview regarding the historical evolution of 
legal origins that helps us understand how the aforementioned may affect people’s (economic) 
incentives, inter alia. Regarding its structure and the way it operates, Civil law relies on 
professional judges and written records—in this sense, it is more bureaucratic and static, —while 
Common law relies on lay judges and oral arguments that can evolve with the passage of time—
in this sense, Common law is more dynamic.  Not only is Civil law more bureaucratic, but due to 
codification, it relies on bright line rules (BLR), which describe exactly the actions that are 
prohibited, but also their specific punishment. That is, in case of an unlawful action, the offender 
will know his punishment with a high certainty.  
Regarding economic markets, Common law favors private market outcomes and 
shareholder protection, while Civil law favors state intervention through its BLRs and stakeholder 
protection. Precisely this favor of Civil law towards stakeholders is the reason corporations in 
countries under this legal regime, must comply with rules that protect stakeholders at a much 
higher degree (e.g., stricter regulations and protection laws), compared to Common law countries. 
Evidently, the legal regime of a country affects corporations in multiple ways, especially in their 
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choices for transparency and better governance (Doidge et al., 2007), where higher investments in 
the aforesaid, might help corporations considerably in the global markets and their potential 
investments in foreign lands.  
We posit that legal origins affect a firm’s investment in CSR activities in at least two ways. 
First, as mentioned before, Civil law countries, and especially countries with French legal origins 
in their judiciary system,22 are characterized by state interventionism, rules, regulations, and, 
generally, more bureaucracy. A reason for this can be traced back in time, when trust and law 
enforcement has been historically lower in countries under the Civil law (e.g., strong feudal lords 
in France), and that the stricter (Napoleonic) Civil law itself was put in place to ensure that the 
will of state was applied.  Second, countries under Civil law have adopted a stakeholder view, 
whereby the rights of stakeholders are above those of shareholders. Therefore, firms in Civil law 
countries are expected to follow corporate doctrines that enhance stakeholder welfare (i.e., higher 
CSR), as opposed to that of shareholders. Ergo, since firms prefer to have the least possible 
intervention from bureaucratic government agencies, they choose to meet the criteria that the state 
has imposed in the first place—which, on average, are expected to be higher compared to Common 
law countries—to enhance stakeholder welfare, which is central under Civil law.  
We argue that legal origins are an appropriate instrument for CSR. First, we contend that 
legal origins have created “deep roots” in the society that determine general behavioral trends 
economic agents (i.e., individuals and firms) follow when they deal with the state and the economy. 
For example, for the case of corporate social responsibility, firms know that under French Civil 
law they do not have many degrees of freedom regarding what they need to offer to stakeholders. 
                                                 
22 Compared to French Civil law, German law did not abolish any prior law, as it was in the case of France during the 
Napoleonic era. The Scandinavian law developed independently, and it is less closely linked to Roman Civil law, and 
thus French Civil law. Hence, of all different manifestations of Civil law, the French Civil law is the one characterized 
by the highest level of intervention in economic, and other activities.  
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That is, in case of a dispute, stakeholders are more likely to win (e.g., stronger unions, stricter 
regulations). Because the society under such a regime requires a firm to care about its stakeholders 
(more compared to a country under the Common law), firms are expected to loyally follow the 
requirement of the society. That is, if a society demands higher CSR they must be willing to 
provide that, or else they will face the competition of other firms or be fined by the state if they 
choose not to comply, or even be stigmatized for their misbehavior. Second, our instrumental 
variables are not expected to affect a firm’s choice to participate in profit shifting activities. 
Although legal origins characterize general behavioral trends in the society, they are not expected 
to affect firms’ choice to do profit shifting. This is because the choice of profit shifting is firm 
specific and not necessarily affected by general societal characteristics, such as legal origins, but 
rather a choice made by people within the firm who take into consideration a number of parameters 
prior to proceeding to the action. 
 Having established that legal origins might act as an appropriate exclusion restriction for 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) measures, we perform an instrumental variables (IV) 
analysis to deal with endogeneity, and an endogenous treatment-regression model (Heckman 
selection) to deal with selectivity.23  
 In mathematical terms, the IV model is the following:  
𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝜓0 + 𝜓1 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖?̂? + 𝜓2ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝜉 + 𝜛𝑖𝑡 (5) 
𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝜅𝑜 + 𝜅1𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑖 + 𝜍𝑖𝑡 (6) 
As in our main specification, 𝑝𝑠 denotes the profit shifting measure, ℎ is a vector of subsidiary-
year and parent-year control variables, 𝜉 represents various fixed effects, while 𝜛 and 𝜍 are the 
                                                 
23 For the case of the Heckman treatment model, high CSR is a dummy variable taking value one when a firm’s CSR 
belongs to highest quartile. 
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error terms. Contrary to the baseline analysis though, instead of using the endogenous 𝐶𝑆𝑅 values 
for our main equation (eq. 5), we use the fitted values obtained from equation 6.  
 The selection model takes the following form: 
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 1 if 𝜇0 + 𝜇1𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝐿𝑎𝑤 +  𝜇2ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝜉 + 𝜁 > 0, with 𝜁 ∼ (0, 𝜎
2)    (7) 
 
𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝜂0 + 𝜂1𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂2ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝜉 + 𝜆 + 𝜔 (8) 
Equation 7 is our selection or treatment equation, and constitutes the first stage of the selection 
model, while equation 8 is the main equation. 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝐶𝑆𝑅 takes value one for all firms that belong 
to the highest CSR quartile. 𝜆 is the inverse Mill’s ratio taken from the first stage and is the 
component that mitigates selection bias. 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 We present the outcomes of this analysis is Table 9. By and large, our results follow the 
same pattern as before. First, for the IV case (column 1 is the second stage outcome and column 2 
the first stage outcome), we find that the CSR still enters with a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient, although in this case the coefficient is larger. This could indicate that omitted variables 
attenuated the effect of CSR in the first place and through our IV we are able to capture an effect 
free of bias and measurement error.24 In accordance with our conjecture, firms from countries 
where French legal origin has prevailed, have higher values of CSR. Statistics at the end of the 
table document that our instrument is relevant and well above the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical 
values, indicating that legal origins is a good instrument for our purpose.25 Moving to the 
                                                 
24 Another reason for such a high coefficient is weak instruments, but this is unlikely to be the case here, as the F-
statistic we obtain is quite large, strongly statistically significant and far above the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical 
values. 
25 Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values demonstrate the strength of the identification. Hence, when the first stage F-
statistic is higher than the SY critical values, we can infer that our identification is strong and that the estimate we 
obtain from the two-stage IV process is less biased compared to that of the OLS.  
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endogenous treatment model (column 3 is the main equation and 4 is the selection equation), we 
see that the value of the High CSR dummy enters with a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient, supporting once again our main hypothesis. In addition, by inspecting Table 9 we 
observe that the hazard lambda for the selection model is negative and statistically significant at 
the 10% level, thus indicating a potential problem of negative selection, which we address through 
the endogenous treatment-regression model.   
 Lacking any policy shock or quasi-experiment at the global level that could have 
potentially provided us with a clear answer to the identification issue, the use of legal origins as 
our exclusion restriction might seem adequate.  Although legal origins have been used several 
times as instrumental variables in the past, a constraint one has to take into consideration is the 
fact that they remain unchanged with the passage of time. Optimally, we would prefer to use an 
instrumental variable that variates between firms but also in time. To this end, following past 
literature (Leaven and Levin, 2009; Lin et al., 2011; Ferrell et al., 2016) we use industry peer’s 
average CSR scores as IV’s for firm specific CSR scores. To do this, we take averages by country, 
industry, and year. Academic research on this topic points to this direction. For example, Cao et 
al. (forthcoming) argue that CSR adaptation can be perceived as a strategic response by firms in a 
specific sector. Precisely, if peers in a specific sector invest more in CSR activities, there is a 
credible threat that some firms may be left behind (laggards) and as such they may be punished in 
the market.26  
 The results presented in Table 10 point to this direction. Using the industry-peer CSR as 
our exclusion restriction, we re-run models similar to those presented in Table 9. Once again, we 
find a positive and statistically significant relationship between CSR and profit shifting. The 
                                                 
26 In fact, this is what Cao et al. (2018) find. In an RDD design, they document that peers having difficulties in catching 
up experience lower stock returns.   
32 
 
magnitude of the coefficient is closer to that found in the baseline specification (see Table 5), albeit 
the coefficient obtained in the IV model is around 6% now.   
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
 Accounting for the endogeneity of the CSR variable, our analysis shows a strong support 
for our hypotheses. Through our IV strategy we were able to study one direction of causality, that 
of CSR to profit shifting. Although we understand that more granular data are needed to strengthen 
the argument of causality, we have, nonetheless, provided statistical inference that purges the 
results obtained from simple OLS regressions. We view this as an important addition to the 
literature that studies the relationship between CSR and tax aggressiveness. 
 
6 Conclusion 
Heretofore, the disciplines of accounting and finance, have ignored the relationship between 
corporate social responsibility and multinationals’ profit shifting (i.e., cross-country tax 
avoidance). CSR could be beneficial for the firm, as it could potentially increase a firm’s value by 
attracting higher quality employees, reducing risk management, and increasing customer loyalty. 
Concurrently, CSR could be also beneficial for the society through responsible firm practices that 
generally avail stakeholders. On top of that, it is possible that firms with higher CSR face reduced 
scrutiny by both the government and the public regarding their practices. Therefore, in case of 
unethical corporate actions, they might be punished less severely.  
Such an action is that of profit shifting which is a very specific form of tax aggressiveness. 
Voices in many countries have already called upon the maligned behavior of some MNEs and 
discussions between politicians and regulators regarding this matter is on the rise. The focal points 
of such discussions gravitate around the fairness of the tax system and potential mechanisms that 
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could curtail profit shifting, but also allow the firms to expand, innovate, and add more jobs in the 
economy. We strongly believe that in the future the discussion about profit shifting will be central 
in the political agenda, especially in large economies such as the European Union and the United 
States.  
This is the first work that thoroughly studies the relationship between corporate social 
responsibility and profit shifting. To accomplish this, we use firm data from a worldwide sample—
509 unique parent firms from 19 OECD countries and China, —and their respective subsidiaries—
6,103 unique subsidiary companies from 63 countries. Our empirical work consists of two stages. 
First, we obtain exogenous profit shifting measures using a difference-in-differences (DiD) 
method. Next, we explicitly study the relationship between corporate social responsibility and 
profit shifting. Not only ours is the first work that studies the relationship between CSR and cross-
country tax avoidance (profit-shifting) but also, based on legitimacy and reputation theories, this 
paper provides evidence of a specific direction of causality: that from CSR to profit shifting. We 
find that CSR and profit shifting have a positive and statistically significant relationship. This 
outcome is strong and survives a battery of robustness tests, including specifications for 
endogeneity and selectivity. We also find that the effect of CSR on profit shifting is larger for 
firms under the territorial tax system, where the incentives for profit shifting are higher. 
 The findings of this work could be useful for policy makers and tax authorities. Our work 
shows that firms with higher CSR scores are more likely to document higher profit shifting. 
Furthermore, past research has found that more socially responsible firms are treated with leniency 
in case corporate scandals erupt. Unfortunately, this could lead to socially wrong incentives. 
Specifically, some firms may strategically increase their CSR scores to avoid scrutiny and receive 
lower punishment for their wrongdoing to the society (including profit shifting activities, inter 
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alia). Therefore, it is in the shoulders of policy makers to devise mechanisms that will lead firms 
to optimally choose the socially beneficial alternatives without creating any negative externalities. 
 This work opens the window for further research in the future. As more detailed corporate 
data are expected to become available, partially because the CSR revolution is expanding in the 
Western World, but also because the above is expected to spread to other economies as they 
become wealthier. With that in mind, it will be possible for future scholars to explicitly study the 
paths of causality using firm level instruments that are much finer—yet unavailable now—than 
time invariant country level variables. This will further refine the estimates regarding the 
relationship between CSR and profit shifting, although a desideratum for clear causality claims is 
(quasi) natural experiments or randomized control trials. Other venues for future research are the 
development of more advanced methods to estimate profit shifting and the compilation of longer 
and richer time series CSR data. We trust that future research will look at these ideas and improve 
our understanding regarding CSR and profit shifting.  
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Table 1: Description of variables 
Variable Definition Source 
EBT Natural logarithm of subsidiary’s pre-tax profits. Orbis 
Low A dummy that equals one when the subsidiary's tax rate is below that 
of their parent, and zero otherwise. 
Own 
calculation 
Parent profits This denotes the parent’s pre-tax and pre-shifting profit. To construct 
it, multiply the asset weighted average profitability of firms in the 
same industry (based on 4-digit NACE codes) and country with the 
parent’s total asset stock. Specifically, parent profits are defined 
as:  ?̃?𝑖𝑡 = 𝑝𝑗𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑡. 
Orbis 
Subsidiary total assets Natural logarithm of subsidiary’s total assets. Orbis 
Subsidiary leverage Total debt to total assets for the subsidiary firm. Orbis 
Subsidiary population Natural logarithm of the total population of the subsidiary's country. World Bank 
Subsidiary GDP capita Natural logarithm of GDP per capita of the subsidiary's country. World Bank 
Profit shifting The profit shifting measure calculated based on the method of 
Dharmapala and Riedel (2013). 
Own 
calculation 
Profit shifting 2 Idem, augmented with subsidiary and year fixed effects. Own 
calculation 
Profit shifting 3 Idem, augmented by controlling for subsidiary, and industry-year 
fixed effects. 
Own 
calculation    
CSR  Parent's composite index of corporate social responsibility. CSR is 
the equal weighted average of three pillar scores (environmental, 
social, and governance performance) from Thomson Reuters 
ASSET4 database. The pillar scores are aggregated from a number 
of individual indicators and ratings collected by ASSET4 on firm 
performance in relation to their wellbeing to the environment, 
society, and other stakeholders. 
Thomson 
Reuters 
ASSET4 
Parent total assets  Natural logarithm of parents’ total assets. Orbis 
Parent leverage  Total debt to total assets for the parent firm. Orbis 
Parent ROA  Parent firm's returns on assets, defined as earnings before tax divided 
by total assets. 
Orbis 
Parent Fixed assets/TA  Parent firm's asset tangibility, defined as total fixed assets to total 
assets. 
Orbis 
Parent R&D/TA  Parent firm's R&D intensity, defined as the amount of R&D 
expenditure divided by total assets. Missing R&D is assumed to be 
zero. 
Orbis 
Subsidiary ROA  Subsidiary's returns on assets, defined as earnings before tax divided 
by total assets. 
Orbis 
Subsidiary Fixed assets/TA  Subsidiary's asset tangibility, defined as total fixed assets to total 
assets. 
Orbis 
Subsidiary R&D/TA  Subsidiary's R&D intensity, defined as the amount of R&D 
expenditure divided by total assets. Missing R&D is assumed to be 
zero. 
Orbis 
Territorial dummy A dummy variable that equals one for parent firms whose countries 
are under a territorial tax system, and zero otherwise. 
Own 
calculation 
French legal origin A dummy that takes the value one for all firms originating from a 
country under French legal origin. 
Own 
calculation 
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
Notes: This table reports summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis. The definition of variables is in Table 1. The values 
for EBT and parent’s profits are in thousands of U.S. dollars, while the values for parent’s and subsidiary’s total assets are in millions 
of U.S. dollars.   
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min p25 p50 p75 Max 
EBT 26,679 14,122.430 152,287.700 -1,554,860 267.888 1930.175 7,037.116 14,200,000 
Low 26,752 0.728 0.445 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Parent profits 26,752 1,087,074 4.726 3.728 379,269 1,209,842 3,066,355 57,024,981 
Profit shifting  26,752 0.305 0.190 0.000 0.000 0.399 0.438 0.528 
Profit shifting (ind) 26,752 0.333 0.207 0.000 0.000 0.435 0.478 0.576 
Profit shifting (year) 26,752 0.277 0.173 0.000 0.000 0.362 0.398 0.480 
CSR  26,752 0.748 0.187 0.064 0.672 0.810 0.886 0.956 
Parent total assets  26,752 19,732 4.384 623.283 6,229.18 24,173.20 65,447.27 492,869.60 
Parent leverage  26,752 0.923 0.229 0.360 0.771 0.929 1.088 1.529 
Parent ROA  26,752 0.076 0.063 -0.084 0.039 0.065 0.106 0.302 
Parent Fixed assets/TA  26,752 0.597 0.147 0.191 0.512 0.606 0.695 0.889 
Parent R&D/TA  26,752 0.027 0.033 0.000 0.001 0.017 0.039 0.158 
Subsidiary total assets  26,752 37.788 4.811 0.995 12.975 3.534 34.261 2,861.21 
Subsidiary leverage  26,752 0.980 0.467 0.147 0.633 0.940 1.286 2.267 
Subsidiary ROA  26,752 0.082 0.152 -0.431 0.013 0.070 0.150 0.575 
Subsidiary Fixed assets/TA  26,752 0.262 0.245 0.000 0.059 0.183 0.409 0.913 
Subsidiary R&D/TA  26,752 0.001 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.078 
Territorial dummy 26,752 0.609 0.488 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
French legal origin 26,752 0.268 0.443 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
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Table 3: Profit shifting estimation 
 
This table reports estimates of profit shifting based on the method developed by Dharmapala 
and Riedel (2013). The dependent variable is EBT, the natural logarithm of subsidiary’s pre-
tax profits. Low is a dummy that takes value one when the subsidiary’s tax rate is below from 
that of the parent company and zero otherwise. Parent profits denotes the parent’s pre-tax and 
pre-shifting profits. Subsidiary total assets is the natural logarithm of subsidiary’s total assets, 
Subsidiary leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets for the subsidiary firm, Subsidiary 
population is the natural logarithm of the total population of the subsidiary’s country, and 
Subsidiary GDP per capita is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita of the subsidiary’s 
country. Each observation is a subsidiary firm tied to a foreign parent firm. Different types of 
fixed effects are utilized in each regression. Industry-year fixed effects are based on 2-digit 
NACE level. Country-year fixed effects are fixed effects for the subsidiary’s country. Stars, 
***, **, and *, indicate significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. t-statistics, 
based on robust standard errors clustered at the subsidiary level, are reported in parentheses. 
A complete description of variables along with their sources is in Table 1.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Low (x) Parent profits 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.032*** 0.030*** 
 (2.958) (2.944) (3.455) (3.073) 
Low -0.263** -0.278** -0.337*** -0.366*** 
 (-2.231) (-2.350) (-2.793) (-2.951) 
Parent profits 0.008 0.011 0.002 0.003 
 (0.896)  (1.189) (0.261) (0.325) 
Subsidiary total assets 0.763*** 0.776*** 0.770*** 0.766*** 
 (49.434) (49.397) (48.373) (47.302) 
Subsidiary  leverage -0.392*** -0.401*** -0.400*** -0.398*** 
 (-16.549) (-16.880) (-16.740) (-16.439) 
Subsidiary  population -1.456*** -0.708* -0.889**  
 (-4.672) (-1.884) (-2.281)  
Subsidiary  GDP per capita 0.073* 0.102** 0.055  
 (1.792) (2.045) (1.075)  
     
Observations 42,712 42,712 42,503 42,473 
Adjusted R-squared 0.819 0.820 0.822 0.822 
Subsidiary effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects No Yes No No 
Industry-year effects No No Yes Yes 
Country-year effects No No No Yes 
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 High CSR  Low CSR  Differences 
Variable N mean p50   N mean p50   Mean Sig. Median Sig. 
Ln(EBT) 10,908 8.259 8.215  10,623 7.902 7.902  0.357 *** 0.313 *** 
Low 13,356 0.759 1.000  13,396 0.698 1.000  0.061 *** 0.000 *** 
Parent profits 13,356 14.495 14.599  13,396 13.304 13.280  1.191 *** 1.320 *** 
Profit shifting  13,356 0.330 0.427  13,396 0.280 0.378  0.050 *** 0.049 *** 
Profit shifting (ind) 13,356 0.360 0.466  13,396 0.305 0.412  0.055 *** 0.054 *** 
Profit shifting (year) 13,356 0.300 0.388  13,396 0.254 0.343  0.046 *** 0.045 *** 
CSR  13,356 0.882 0.886  13,396 0.613 0.672  0.269 *** 0.214 *** 
Parent ln(Total assets)  13,356 10.547 10.789  13,396 9.234 9.118  1.313 *** 1.671 *** 
Parent Leverage  13,356 0.951 0.973  13,396 0.895 0.897  0.055 *** 0.075 *** 
Parent ROA  13,356 0.079 0.067  13,396 0.073 0.064  0.006 *** 0.003 *** 
Parent Fixed assets/TA  13,356 0.613 0.620  13,396 0.580 0.586  0.033 *** 0.034 *** 
Parent R&D/TA  13,356 0.031 0.023  13,396 0.023 0.010  0.008 *** 0.013 *** 
Subsidiary ln(Total assets)  13,356 3.830 3.720  13,396 3.435 3.333  0.395 *** 0.387 *** 
Subsidiary Leverage  13,356 0.990 0.951  13,396 0.969 0.927  0.021 *** 0.024 *** 
Subsidiary ROA  13,356 0.085 0.071  13,396 0.079 0.069  0.006 *** 0.002 *** 
Subsidiary Fixed assets/TA  13,356 0.253 0.171  13,396 0.271 0.195  -0.018 *** -0.024 *** 
Subsidiary R&D/TA  13,356 0.001 0.000  13,396 0.001 0.000  0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
Territorial dummy 13,356 0.592 1.000  13,396 0.626 1.000  -0.034 *** 0.000 *** 
 
 
 
Table 4: High vs. low CSR  
 
This table reports differences of the main variables between the firms with high (above the median) CSR scores and firms with low 
(below the median) CSR scores.  Stars, ***, **, and *, indicate significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 5: Baseline specification 
 
The dependent variable is profit shifting and it is calculated according to the method of Dharmapala and 
Riedel (2013) shown in equation (1). CSR is a parent company’s corporate social responsibility index and 
it is measured as the equal weight of three pillar scores (environmental, social, and governance 
performance). We include the following controls for both parent and subsidiary companies: Total assets— 
the natural logarithm of total assets, leverage— the ratio of total debt to total assets for the firm, ROA—a 
firm’s returns on assets, defined as earnings before tax divided by total assets, Fixed assets/TA—a firm’s 
asset tangibility, and R&D/TA—a firm’s R&D intensity. Each observation is a subsidiary firm tied to a 
foreign parent firm. Different types of fixed effects are utilized in each regression. Industry-year fixed 
effects are based on 2-digit NACE level. Country-year fixed effects are fixed effects for the subsidiary’s 
country. Stars, ***, **, and *, indicate significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. t-statistics, 
based on robust standard errors clustered at the subsidiary level, are reported in parentheses. A complete 
description of variables along with their sources is in Table 1.   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CSR t-1 0.030*** 0.024** 0.030*** 0.024** 
 (3.158) (2.488) (3.089) (2.437) 
Parent ln(Total assets) t-1  0.014***  0.014*** 
  (3.975)  (3.856) 
Parent Leverage t-1  -0.009  -0.009 
  (-1.189)  (-1.208) 
Parent ROA t-1  0.010  0.012 
  (0.626)  (0.741) 
Parent Fixed assets/TA t-1  -0.030***  -0.029*** 
  (-2.746)  (-2.681) 
Parent R&D/TA t-1  0.118*  0.109 
  (1.691)  (1.554) 
Subsidiary ln(Total assets) t-1   0.002* 0.002* 
   (1.732) (1.706) 
Subsidiary Leverage t-1   0.000 0.000 
   (0.004) (0.019) 
Subsidiary ROA t-1   -0.011 -0.011 
   (-1.479) (-1.490) 
Subsidiary Fixed assets/TA t-1   -0.009 -0.009 
   (-1.477) (-1.470) 
Subsidiary R&D/TA t-1   -0.240* -0.238* 
   (-1.808) (-1.796) 
     
Observations 26,752 26,752 26,752 26,752 
Adjusted R-squared 0.742 0.742 0.742 0.742 
Parent FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Parent Industry*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Parent Country*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Subsidiary Industry*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Subsidiary Country*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 6: Sensitivity tests 
 
The dependent variables are various forms of profit shifting. CSR is a parent company’s corporate social 
responsibility index and it is measured as the equal weight of three pillar scores (environmental, social, 
and governance performance). We include the following controls for both parent and subsidiary 
companies: Total assets— the natural logarithm of total assets, leverage— the ratio of total debt to total 
assets for the firm, ROA—a firm’s returns on assets, defined as earnings before tax divided by total assets, 
Fixed assets/TA—a firm’s asset tangibility, and R&D/TA—a firm’s R&D intensity. Each observation is a 
subsidiary firm tied to a foreign parent firm. Different types of fixed effects are utilized in each regression. 
Industry-year fixed effects are based on 2-digit NACE level. Country-year fixed effects are fixed effects 
for the subsidiary’s country. Stars, ***, **, and *, indicate significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. t-statistics, based on robust standard errors, are reported in parentheses. A complete 
description of variables along with their sources is in Table 1.   
Estimation method OLS 
Bootstrap 
(500) 
OLS 
 Profit 
shifting 2 
Profit  
shifting 3 
Profit  
shifting 
Profit  
shifting 
Profit  
shifting 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CSR t-1 0.026** 0.022** 0.024** 0.024* 0.016** 
 (2.437) (2.437) (2.296) (1.901) (2.119) 
Parent ln(Total assets) t-1 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 
 (3.856) (3.856) (2.827) (3.139) (5.998) 
Parent Leverage t-1 -0.010 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 
 (-1.208) (-1.208) (-1.095) (-0.895) (-1.565) 
Parent ROA t-1 0.013 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.011 
 (0.741) (0.741) (0.658) (0.503) (0.893) 
Parent Fixed assets/TA t-1 -0.032*** -0.026*** -0.029* -0.029* -0.044*** 
 (-2.681) (-2.681) (-1.698) (-1.907) (-5.223) 
Parent R&D/TA t-1 0.119 0.099 0.109 0.109 0.092* 
 (1.554) (1.554) (1.241) (1.098) (1.877) 
Subsidiary ln(Total assets) t-1 0.002* 0.002* 0.002 0.002*** -0.001 
 (1.706) (1.706) (1.523) (3.465) (-0.656) 
Subsidiary Leverage t-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.003 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.015) (0.035) (-1.440) 
Subsidiary ROA t-1 -0.012 -0.010 -0.011 -0.011** -0.003 
 (-1.490) (-1.490) (-1.116) (-2.405) (-0.836) 
Subsidiary Fixed assets/TA t-1 -0.010 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009*** -0.001 
 (-1.470) (-1.470) (-1.258) (-2.998) (-0.330) 
Subsidiary R&D/TA t-1 -0.260* -0.216* -0.238 -0.238*** 0.028 
 (-1.796) (-1.796) (-1.530) (-3.410) (0.252) 
      
Observations 26,752 26,752 26,752 26,752 26,752 
Adjusted R-squared 0.742 0.742 0.741 0.742 0.944 
Standard errors clustered at: Subsidiary Subsidiary Parent  Subsidiary Subsidiary 
Parent FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Subsidiary FE No No No No Yes 
Parent Industry*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Parent Country*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Subsidiary Industry*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Subsidiary Country*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 7: Worldwide vs. territorial tax systems 
 
The dependent variable is profit shifting and it is calculated according to the method of 
Dharmapala and Riedel (2013) shown in equation (1). CSR is a parent company’s corporate 
social responsibility index and it is measured as the equal weight of three pillar scores 
(environmental, social, and governance performance). We include the following controls for 
both parent and subsidiary companies: Territorial—a dummy that equals one for countries 
with a territorial tax system, and zero for countries under a worldwide tax system, Total 
assets— the natural logarithm of total assets, leverage— the ratio of total debt to total assets 
for the firm, ROA—a firm’s returns on assets, defined as earnings before tax divided by total 
assets, Fixed assets/TA—a firm’s asset tangibility, and R&D/TA—a firm’s R&D intensity. 
Each observation is a subsidiary firm tied to a foreign parent firm. Different types of fixed 
effects are utilized in each regression. Industry-year fixed effects are based on 2-digit NACE 
level. Country-year fixed effects are fixed effects for the subsidiary’s country. Stars, ***, 
**, and *, indicate significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. t-statistics, 
based on robust standard errors clustered at the subsidiary level, are reported in parentheses. 
A complete description of variables along with their sources is in Table 1.   
 Worldwide Territorial Pooled 
  (1) (2) (3) 
CSR t-1 0.005** 0.038** 0.000 
 (2.219) (2.400) (0.017) 
CSR t-1 × Territorial dummy   0.040** 
   (2.230) 
Parent ln(Total assets) t-1 0.024*** 0.010 0.014*** 
 (30.259) (1.611) (4.024) 
Parent Leverage t-1 -0.005*** -0.008 -0.008 
 (-3.011) (-0.567) (-1.049) 
Parent ROA t-1 -0.001 0.045 0.013 
 (-0.290) (1.498) (0.824) 
Parent Fixed assets/TA t-1 -0.001 -0.075*** -0.029*** 
 (-0.224) (-3.194) (-2.706) 
Parent R&D/TA t-1 0.047*** 0.355** 0.114 
 (3.346) (2.198) (1.625) 
Subsidiary ln(Total assets) t-1 -0.000*** 0.002 0.002* 
 (-2.844) (1.574) (1.712) 
Subsidiary Leverage t-1 0.000 -0.004 0.000 
 (1.496) (-1.009) (0.019) 
Subsidiary ROA t-1 0.001 -0.008 -0.011 
 (0.700) (-0.845) (-1.488) 
Subsidiary Fixed assets/TA t-1 -0.000 -0.009 -0.009 
 (-0.085) (-1.165) (-1.465) 
Subsidiary R&D/TA t-1 0.002 -0.174 -0.238* 
 (0.285) (-0.667) (-1.793) 
    
Observations 9,450 17,302 26,752 
Adjusted R-squared 0.982 0.777 0.742 
Parent FE Yes Yes Yes 
Parent Industry*Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Parent Country*Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Subsidiary Industry*Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Subsidiary Country*Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 8: Causality running from profit shifting to CSR 
 
The dependent variable is 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑡, a parent company’s corporate social responsibility index 
measured as the equal weight of three pillar scores (environmental, social, and governance 
performance). Profit shifting is calculated according to the method of Dharmapala and Riedel 
(2013) shown in equation (1). We include the following controls for both parent and subsidiary 
companies: Total assets— the natural logarithm of total assets, leverage— the ratio of total debt 
to total assets for the firm, ROA—a firm’s returns on assets, defined as earnings before tax divided 
by total assets, Fixed assets/TA—a firm’s asset tangibility, and R&D/TA—a firm’s R&D intensity. 
Each observation is a subsidiary firm tied to a foreign parent firm. Different types of fixed effects 
are utilized in each regression. Industry-year fixed effects are based on 2-digit NACE level. 
Country-year fixed effects are fixed effects for the subsidiary’s country. Stars, ***, **, and *, 
indicate significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. t-statistics, based on robust 
standard errors clustered at the subsidiary level, are reported in parentheses. A complete 
description of variables along with their sources is in Table 1.   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Profit shifting t-1 -0.000 -0.003 -0.000 -0.003 -0.007 
 (-0.194) (-1.319) (-0.169) (-1.321) (-0.961) 
Parent ln(Total assets) t-1  0.079***  0.079*** 0.075*** 
  (13.433)  (13.429) (11.600) 
Parent Leverage t-1  0.068***  0.068*** 0.066*** 
  (7.525)  (7.535) (6.948) 
Parent ROA t-1  0.165***  0.165*** 0.153*** 
  (9.338)  (9.337) (8.242) 
Parent Fixed assets/TA t-1  -0.003  -0.002 -0.008 
  (-0.180)  (-0.177) (-0.528) 
Parent R&D/TA t-1  0.581***  0.581*** 0.577*** 
  (6.521)  (6.521) (5.955) 
Subsidiary ln(Total assets) t-1   0.000 0.000 0.001 
   (1.466) (0.537) (0.484) 
Subsidiary Leverage t-1   -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
   (-1.284) (-1.407) (-0.959) 
Subsidiary ROA t-1   0.001 0.000 -0.002 
   (0.437) (0.069) (-0.511) 
Subsidiary Fixed assets/TA t-1   -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
   (-0.540) (-0.609) (0.086) 
Subsidiary R&D/TA t-1   0.006 0.008 -0.042 
   (0.237) (0.369) (-0.481) 
      
Observations 22,690 22,690 22,690 22,690 22,690 
Adjusted R-squared 0.941 0.945 0.941 0.945 0.933 
Parent FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Subsidiary FE No No No No Yes 
Parent Industry*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Parent Country*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Subsidiary Industry*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Subsidiary Country*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 9: Endogeneity and selectivity using legal origins as exclusion restriction 
 
This table shows the relationship between CSR and profit shifting when accounting for 
endogeneity and selectivity. Profit shifting is calculated according to the method of Dharmapala 
and Riedel (2013) shown in equation (1). CSR is a parent company’s corporate social 
responsibility index and it is measured as the equal weight of three pillar scores (environmental, 
social, and governance performance). High CSR is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for firms 
with CSR scores at the highest quartile. Other controls, for both parent and subsidiary companies, 
include: Total assets— the natural logarithm of total assets, leverage— the ratio of total debt to 
total assets for the firm, ROA—a firm’s returns on assets, defined as earnings before tax divided 
by total assets, Fixed assets/TA—a firm’s asset tangibility, and R&D/TA—a firm’s R&D intensity. 
Each observation is a subsidiary firm tied to a foreign parent firm. Different types of fixed effects 
are utilized in each regression. Stars, ***, **, and *, indicate significance levels at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10%, respectively. t-statistics, based on robust standard errors clustered at the subsidiary level, 
are reported in parentheses. A complete description of variables along with their sources is in 
Table 1.   
Method IV  Heckman Selection 
Dependent variable 
Profit 
shifting t 
CSR t-1  
Profit 
shifting t 
High CSR 
(top 25%) 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
CSR t-1 (fitted) 0.147**     
  (2.201)     
High CSR (top 25%) t-1    0.036**  
     (1.980)  
French legal origin  0.099***   0.475*** 
  (16.707)   (20.958) 
Parent ln(Total assets) t-1 0.039*** 0.060***  0.014*** 0.438*** 
 (8.643) (30.197)  (2.623) (53.875) 
Parent Leverage t-1 -0.103*** 0.116***  0.004 0.567*** 
 (-6.726) (8.853)  (0.344) (11.902) 
Parent ROA t-1 0.047 0.443***  0.006 3.940*** 
 (1.113) (11.135)  (0.198) (21.056) 
Parent Fixed assets/TA t-1 -0.020 -0.027  -0.022 0.813*** 
 (-1.016) (-1.418)  (-1.171) (10.300) 
Parent R&D/TA t-1 0.234** 0.743***  -0.186 8.547*** 
 (2.374) (7.297)  (-1.444) (26.231) 
Subsidiary ln(Total assets) t-1 -0.000 0.004***  -0.009*** 0.007 
 (-0.186) (2.878)  (-14.636) (1.132) 
Subsidiary Leverage t-1 -0.006 -0.006  -0.014*** 0.024 
 (-1.349) (-1.469)  (-7.352) (1.115) 
Subsidiary ROA t-1 -0.024** -0.009  0.010* 0.097 
 (-2.274) (-0.978)  (1.685) (1.451) 
Subsidiary Fixed assets/TA t-1 -0.023*** 0.005  0.009** -0.093** 
 (-2.635) (0.684)  (2.259) (-2.273) 
Subsidiary R&D/TA t-1 -0.185 -0.313  0.187* 0.242 
 (-0.974) (-1.358)  (1.957) (0.236) 
Hazard lambda    -0.020*  
    (-1.925)  
Observations 26,752 26,752  26,752 26,752 
Adjusted R-squared 0.492 0.524    
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic  250.191***    
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic  1264.105***    
Stock-Yogo critical values 10%  16.38    
F-statistics  279.130***    
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Table 10: Endogeneity and selectivity using industry-peer CSR as exclusion 
restriction 
 
This table shows the relationship between CSR and profit shifting when accounting for endogeneity 
and selectivity. Profit shifting is calculated according to the method of Dharmapala and Riedel 
(2013) shown in equation (1). CSR is a parent company’s corporate social responsibility index and 
it is measured as the equal weight of three pillar scores (environmental, social, and governance 
performance). High CSR is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for firms with CSR scores at the 
highest quartile. Other controls, for both parent and subsidiary companies, include: Total assets— 
the natural logarithm of total assets, leverage— the ratio of total debt to total assets for the firm, 
ROA—a firm’s returns on assets, defined as earnings before tax divided by total assets, Fixed 
assets/TA—a firm’s asset tangibility, and R&D/TA—a firm’s R&D intensity. Each observation is a 
subsidiary firm tied to a foreign parent firm. Different types of fixed effects are utilized in each 
regression. Stars, ***, **, and *, indicate significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
t-statistics, based on robust standard errors clustered at the subsidiary level, are reported in 
parentheses. A complete description of variables along with their sources is in Table 1.   
Method IV  Heckman Selection 
Dependent variable 
Profit 
shifting t 
CSR t-1 
 Profit 
shifting t 
High CSR  
(top 25%) 
  (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
CSR t-1 (fitted) 0.059**     
  (2.459)     
High CSR (top 25%) t-1    0.027*  
     (1.890)  
Industry-Peer CSR t-1  0.624***   2.969*** 
  (26.117)   (36.549) 
Parent ln(Total assets) t-1 0.010*** 0.064***  0.015*** 0.457*** 
 (2.792) (15.187)  (2.994) (54.930) 
Parent Leverage t-1 -0.004 0.019**  0.007 0.508*** 
 (-0.537) (2.516)  (0.581) (10.439) 
Parent ROA t-1 -0.001 0.185***  0.015 3.897*** 
 (-0.044) (12.397)  (0.526) (20.980) 
Parent Fixed assets/TA t-1 -0.033*** 0.010  -0.020 0.694*** 
 (-3.220) (0.904)  (-1.061) (8.536) 
Parent R&D/TA t-1 0.029 0.656***  -0.183 9.636*** 
 (0.460) (8.787)  (-1.416) (28.479) 
Subsidiary ln(Total assets) t-1 0.002* 0.0003*  -0.009*** 0.001 
 (1.769) (1.725)  (-14.575) (0.081) 
Subsidiary Leverage t-1 -0.000 -0.001  -0.014*** 0.033 
 (-0.080) (-1.159)  (-7.373) (1.544) 
Subsidiary ROA t-1 -0.012 -0.003  0.010 0.162** 
 (-1.621) (-1.342)  (1.638) (2.376) 
Subsidiary Fixed assets/TA t-1 -0.010 -0.001  0.008** -0.016 
 (-1.572) (-0.555)  (2.080) (-0.372) 
Subsidiary R&D/TA t-1 -0.244* 0.055*  0.188** 0.092 
 (-1.850) (1.681)  (1.970) (0.088) 
Hazard lambda    -0.016*  
    (-1.828)  
   
 
  
Observation 26,752 26,752  26,752 26,752 
Adjusted R-squared 0.742 0.937    
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic  298.485***    
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic  4591.700***    
Stock Yogo Critical values 10%  16.38    
F-statistics   682.110***    
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Figure 1: Corporate social responsibility and profit shifting 
 
This figure shows the relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and profit shifting. This graph 
utilizes average values of CSR and profit shifting for countries of the parent companies for the years 2009-2016. 
Profit shifting and it is calculated according to the method of Dharmapala and Riedel (2013) shown in equation (1). 
CSR is a parent company’s corporate social responsibility index and it is measured as the equal weight of three 
pillar scores (environmental, social, and governance performance). 
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Appendix 
 
 
This appendix contains auxiliary information to the main text. Tables A1 and A2 provide 
information about the distributions of subsidiary and parent firms. Table A3 shows the evolution 
of CSR over the years (average values), while Table A4 provides the correlations of the main 
variables used in our analysis. Table A5 runs the same specification as our baseline model for all 
firms but those MNEs from the United States. Table A6 reports results where we interact U.S. only 
firms and those under the territorial tax system. Table A7 repeats our baseline specification but 
now using changes instead of levels. In Table A8, we test the reverse causality issue, where again 
we use changes instead of levels. In Table A9 we re-run the most conservative form of our baseline 
specification using a Tobit model. Table 10 presents an alternative profit shifting estimation, where 
instead of using parent earnings defined as  ?̃?, we use true pre-tax parent earnings, 𝜋. Finally, in 
Table A11 we repeat the exercise of baseline Table 5, with the alternative measure of profit 
shifting. 
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Table A1: Information regarding subsidiary firms 
 
This table reports the number of unique subsidiary firms in each country, along with average CSR and 
profit shifting scores. For example, there are 351 unique subsidiaries in Belgium—fully owned or 
partially owned by MNEs outside Belgium,—which equals 5.84% of our sample.    
Country 
Country 
code 
Subsidiaries 
Subsidiaries 
% 
CSR 
Profit shifting  
measure 
Albania AL 1 0.02% 0.767 0.416 
Austria AT 89 1.48% 0.741 0.376 
Australia AU 190 3.16% 0.721 0.245 
Bosnia and Herzegovina BA 2 0.03% 0.626 0.416 
Bangladesh BD 1 0.02% 0.916 0.060 
Belgium BE 351 5.84% 0.757 0.123 
Bulgaria BG 51 0.85% 0.774 0.415 
Brazil BR 33 0.55% 0.787 0.105 
Botswana BW 1 0.02% 0.783 0.198 
Canada CA 1 0.02% 0.885 0.509 
Chile CL 4 0.07% 0.806 0.451 
China CN 388 6.45% 0.781 0.346 
Colombia CO 9 0.15% 0.801 0.238 
Czech Republic CZ 226 3.76% 0.736 0.409 
Germany DE 638 10.61% 0.754 0.302 
Denmark DK 96 1.60% 0.741 0.272 
Estonia EE 23 0.38% 0.725 0.293 
Spain ES 425 7.07% 0.739 0.286 
Finland FI 48 0.80% 0.735 0.359 
France FR 618 10.28% 0.718 0.207 
Great Britain GB 646 10.74% 0.731 0.402 
Ghana GH 1 0.02% 0.904 0.124 
Greece GR 64 1.06% 0.799 0.359 
Croatia HR 39 0.65% 0.808 0.398 
Hungary HU 97 1.61% 0.753 0.410 
Ireland IE 92 1.53% 0.735 0.399 
India IN 11 0.18% 0.863 0.136 
Iceland IS 3 0.05% 0.746 0.385 
Italy IT 377 6.27% 0.729 0.219 
Jamaica JM 1 0.02% 0.719 0.000 
Japan JP 27 0.45% 0.834 0.168 
Kenya KE 1 0.02% 0.904 0.000 
Korea (South) KR 97 1.61% 0.765 0.361 
Cayman Islands KY 1 0.02% 0.668 0.419 
Kazakhstan  KZ 1 0.02% 0.689 0.377 
Lithuania LT 9 0.15% 0.745 0.412 
Luxembourg  LU 23 0.38% 0.833 0.243 
Latvia LV 26 0.43% 0.800 0.411 
FYROM MK 1 0.02% 0.743 0.383 
Malta MT 3 0.05% 0.907 0.381 
(Table A1 continues on next page) 
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(Table A1 continued from previous page) 
Country 
Country 
code 
Subsidiaries 
Subsidiaries 
% 
CSR 
Profit shifting  
measure 
Mexico MX 5 0.08% 0.651 0.172 
Malaysia MY 16 0.27% 0.779 0.407 
Nigeria NG 3 0.05% 0.844 0.000 
Netherlands NL 48 0.80% 0.754 0.362 
Norway NO 125 2.08% 0.757 0.247 
Oman OM 1 0.02% 0.740 0.360 
Panama PA 1 0.02% 0.810 0.450 
Pakistan PK 3 0.05% 0.855 0.000 
Poland PL 213 3.54% 0.790 0.413 
Portugal PT 116 1.93% 0.795 0.363 
Romania RO 134 2.23% 0.774 0.421 
Serbia RS 27 0.45% 0.760 0.423 
Russian Federation RU 285 4.74% 0.734 0.375 
Sweden SE 163 2.71% 0.753 0.326 
Slovenia SI 20 0.33% 0.810 0.422 
Slovakia SK 88 1.46% 0.732 0.368 
Turkey TR 2 0.03% 0.831 0.405 
Taiwan TW 2 0.03% 0.809 0.407 
Ukraine UA 22 0.37% 0.809 0.434 
United States US 9 0.15% 0.759 0.000 
Viet Nam VN 13 0.22% 0.667 0.399 
South Africa ZA 1 0.02% 0.606 0.000 
Zambia ZM 1 0.02% 0.698 0.000 
Total  6,013 100.0%   
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Table A2: Parent distribution 
 
This table reports the number of unique parent firms in each country, along with average 
CSR and profit shifting scores. For example, there are 116 unique parent firms from 
Great Britain, making up about 22.8% of the parent firms on our sample. These 116 
British parent firms fully (or partially) own 923 subsidiaries around the world.     
Owner 
country 
Parents 
Parents 
% 
Subsidiaries 
Subsidiaries 
% 
CSR 
Profit 
shifting 
measure 
Austria 2 0.39% 38 0.6% 0.539 0.188 
Australia 2 0.39% 5 0.1% 0.792 0.214 
Belgium 5 0.98% 81 1.3% 0.650 0.355 
Switzerland 1 0.2% 7 0.1% 0.273 0.158 
China 3 0.59% 11 0.2% 0.339 0.065 
Germany 34 6.68% 915 15.2% 0.570 0.263 
Denmark 2 0.39% 18 0.3% 0.799 0.248 
Spain 14 2.75% 130 2.2% 0.778 0.192 
Finland 6 1.18% 73 1.2% 0.771 0.151 
France 35 6.88% 1,149 19.1% 0.751 0.323 
Great Britain 116 22.79% 923 15.4% 0.669 0.082 
Hungary 1 0.2% 7 0.1% 0.376 0.236 
Ireland 3 0.59% 26 0.4% 0.544 0.000 
Israel 1 0.2% 3 0.0% 0.282 0.051 
Italy 3 0.59% 40 0.7% 0.795 0.307 
Netherlands 14 2.75% 189 3.1% 0.660 0.140 
Norway 2 0.39% 10 0.2% 0.715 0.145 
Poland 3 0.59% 17 0.3% 0.202 0.000 
Sweden 20 3.93% 255 4.2% 0.559 0.224 
United States 242 47.54% 2,116 35.2% 0.542 0.382 
Total 509 100% 6,013 100.0%   
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 Table A3: CSR over the years 
 
This table reports the number of observations, along with average scores for CSR and 
profit shifting, by year. Additionally, it also shows the number of unique parent firms 
by year. For example, compared to 2009 (the initial year of our study), where we had 
166 unique parent firms, in 2016, this number has increased around 2.5 times, 
indicating that more than 270 new unique firms entered the sample.     
Year Subsidiaries Percent 
Unique 
parents 
 CSR 
Profit 
shifting  
measure 
2009 1,643 6.14 166  0.714 0.332 
2010 2,518 9.41 288  0.750 0.314 
2011 3,324 12.43 332  0.755 0.314 
2012 3,354 12.54 336  0.753 0.306 
2013 3,609 13.49 347  0.753 0.307 
2014 3,713 13.88 355  0.751 0.293 
2015 4,195 15.68 377  0.743 0.292 
2016 4,396 16.43 438  0.747 0.301 
Total 26,752 100   0.748 0.305 
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Table A4: Correlation matrix 
 
This table presents correlations of the variables used in the study. The sample includes data for the period 2009-2016 
where each observation is a subsidiary firm tied to a foreign parent firm. Star indicates statistical significance at the 1% 
level. Sample size (N = 26,752). 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
EBT (1) 1        
Low (2) 0.034* 1       
Parent profits  (3) 0.204* 0.265* 1      
Profit shifting (4) 0.069* 0.981* 0.416* 1     
CSR (5) 0.129* 0.049* 0.434* 0.125* 1    
Parent ln(Total assets)  (6) 0.188* 0.261* 0.866* 0.390* 0.518* 1   
Parent Leverage  (7) -0.006 -0.093* 0.065* -0.079* 0.218* 0.229* 1  
Parent ROA  (8) 0.089* 0.051* 0.014 0.059* -0.001 -0.125* -0.287* 1           
 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
          
Parent Fixed assets/TA  (9) 1        
Parent R&D/TA  (10) -0.244* 1       
Subsidiary ln(Total assets)  (11) 0.081* 0.055* 1      
Subsidiary Leverage  (12) -0.050* -0.005 -0.033* 1     
Subsidiary ROA  (13) -0.01 0.076* -0.040* -0.254* 1    
Subsidiary Fixed assets/TA  (14) 0.152* -0.153* 0.232* -0.115* -0.149* 1   
Subsidiary R&D/TA  (15) -0.016* 0.132* 0.092* -0.038* -0.008 0.005 1  
Parent territorial dummy (16) 0.091* -0.387* -0.067* 0.037* -0.052* 0.108* -0.064* 1 
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Table A5: Results excluding U.S. parent firms 
 
The dependent variable is profit shifting and it is calculated according to the method of Dharmapala and 
Riedel (2013) shown in equation (1). CSR is a parent company’s corporate social responsibility index 
and it is measured as the equal weight of three pillar scores (environmental, social, and governance 
performance). We include the following controls for both parent and subsidiary companies: Total 
assets— the natural logarithm of total assets, leverage— the ratio of total debt to total assets for the firm, 
ROA—a firm’s returns on assets, defined as earnings before tax divided by total assets, Fixed 
assets/TA—a firm’s asset tangibility, and R&D/TA—a firm’s R&D intensity. Each observation is a 
subsidiary firm tied to a foreign parent firm. Different types of fixed effects are utilized in each 
regression. Industry-year fixed effects are based on 2-digit NACE level. Country-year fixed effects are 
fixed effects for the subsidiary’s country. Stars, ***, **, and *, indicate significance levels at the 1%, 
5%, and 10%, respectively. t-statistics, based on robust standard errors clustered at the subsidiary level, 
are reported in parentheses. A complete description of variables along with their sources is in Table 1.   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CSR t-1 0.041*** 0.038** 0.040*** 0.037** 
 (2.639) (2.450) (2.582) (2.400) 
Parent ln(Total assets) t-1  0.011*  0.011* 
  (1.746)  (1.663) 
Parent Leverage t-1  -0.009  -0.009 
  (-0.646)  (-0.616) 
Parent ROA t-1  0.042  0.043 
  (1.405)  (1.440) 
Parent Fixed assets/TA t-1  -0.075***  -0.074*** 
  (-3.234)  (-3.184) 
Parent R&D/TA t-1  0.363**  0.351** 
  (2.257)  (2.194) 
Subsidiary ln(Total assets) t-1   0.002 0.002 
   (1.553) (1.544) 
Subsidiary Leverage t-1   -0.004 -0.004 
   (-1.121) (-1.096) 
Subsidiary ROA t-1   -0.010 -0.010 
   (-1.024) (-1.020) 
Subsidiary Fixed assets/TA t-1   -0.009 -0.009 
   (-1.174) (-1.159) 
Subsidiary R&D/TA t-1   -0.184 -0.179 
   (-0.712) (-0.690) 
     
Observations 17,491 17,491 17,491 17,491 
Adjusted R-squared 0.777 0.777 0.777 0.777 
Parent FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Parent Industry*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Parent Country*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Subsidiary Industry*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Subsidiary Country*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table A6: US firms vs. firms under the territorial rule 
 
The dependent variable is profit shifting and it is calculated according to the method of Dharmapala 
and Riedel (2013) shown in equation (1). CSR is a parent company’s corporate social responsibility 
index and it is measured as the equal weight of three pillar scores (environmental, social, and 
governance performance). We include the following controls for both parent and subsidiary 
companies: Territorial—a dummy that equals one for countries with a territorial tax system, and 
zero for countries under a worldwide tax system, Total assets— the natural logarithm of total assets, 
leverage— the ratio of total debt to total assets for the firm, ROA—a firm’s returns on assets, 
defined as earnings before tax divided by total assets, Fixed assets/TA—a firm’s asset tangibility, 
and R&D/TA—a firm’s R&D intensity. Each observation is a subsidiary firm tied to a foreign 
parent firm. Different types of fixed effects are utilized in each regression. Industry-year fixed 
effects are based on 2-digit NACE level. Country-year fixed effects are fixed effects for the 
subsidiary’s country. Stars, ***, **, and *, indicate significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. t-statistics, based on robust standard errors clustered at the subsidiary level, are 
reported in parentheses. A complete description of variables along with their sources is in Table 1.    
 US sample Territorial Pooled 
  (1) (2) (3) 
CSR t-1 0.005** 0.038** -0.000 
 (2.028) (2.400) (-0.002) 
CSR t-1 × Territorial dummy   0.041** 
 
  (2.244) 
Parent ln(Total assets) t-1 0.024*** 0.010 0.014*** 
 (31.093) (1.611) (4.004) 
Parent Leverage t-1 -0.005*** -0.008 -0.008 
 (-3.154) (-0.567) (-1.030) 
Parent ROA t-1 -0.001 0.045 0.013 
 (-0.170) (1.498) (0.811) 
Parent Fixed assets/TA t-1 0.000 -0.075*** -0.030*** 
 (0.042) (-3.194) (-2.740) 
Parent R&D/TA t-1 0.046*** 0.355** 0.113 
 (3.362) (2.198) (1.611) 
Subsidiary ln(Total assets) t-1 -0.000** 0.002 0.002* 
 (-2.554) (1.574) (1.755) 
Subsidiary Leverage t-1 0.000 -0.004 0.000 
 (0.672) (-1.009) (0.067) 
Subsidiary ROA t-1 0.000 -0.008 -0.011 
 (0.281) (-0.845) (-1.394) 
Subsidiary Fixed assets/TA t-1 -0.001** -0.009 -0.009 
 (-2.006) (-1.165) (-1.474) 
Subsidiary R&D/TA t-1 0.005 -0.174 -0.246* 
 (0.873) (-0.667) (-1.845) 
 
   
Observations 9,261 17,302 26,563 
Adjusted R-squared 0.980 0.777 0.739 
Parent FE Yes Yes Yes 
Parent Industry*Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Parent Country*Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Subsidiary Industry*Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Subsidiary Country*Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
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Table A7: Changes in profit shifting and changes in 
corporate social responsibility  
 
The dependent variable is the change of profit shifting measure from 
period (t-1) to t. The main independent variable is the (lagged) change 
of CSR from period (t-2) to (t-1). Model (2) also includes the lagged 
level of the dependent variable as a regressor to take into consideration 
cases where changes in the dependent variable are small. All other 
control variables are (lagged) changes from period (t-2) to (t-1). Stars, 
***, **, and *, indicate significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. t-statistics, based on robust standard errors clustered at 
the subsidiary level, are reported in parentheses. A complete 
description of variables along with their sources is in Table 1. 
  (1) (2) 
∆ CSR from t-2 to t-1 0.024*** 0.020*** 
 (3.688) (3.140) 
Profit shifting t-1  -0.046*** 
   
Δ(Var(t−2)→(t−1))   
Δ Parent ln(Total assets) -0.004 -0.002 
 (-1.277) (-0.741) 
Δ Parent leverage -0.002 0.002 
 (-0.422) (0.384) 
Δ Parent ROA -0.002 -0.003 
 (-0.167) (-0.268) 
Δ Parent Fixed assets / TA 0.003 0.001 
 (0.313) (0.065) 
Δ Parent R&D / TA -0.260*** -0.351*** 
 (-6.218) (-7.798) 
Δ Subsidiary ln(Total assets) -0.000 0.001 
 (-0.000) (0.730) 
Δ Subsidiary leverage -0.001 -0.002 
 (-0.472) (-0.868) 
Δ Subsidiary ROA -0.004 -0.005 
 (-1.007) (-1.171) 
Δ Subsidiary Fixed assets / TA -0.002 -0.001 
 (-0.281) (-0.189) 
Δ Subsidiary R&D / TA -0.022 -0.071 
 (-0.058) (-0.187) 
Constant -0.002*** 0.012*** 
 (-6.906) (11.782) 
Observations 19,844 19,844 
Adjusted R-squared 0.001 0.021 
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Table A8: Changes in corporate social responsibility 
and changes profit shifting 
 
The dependent variable is the change of CSR measure from period 
(t-1) to t. The main independent variable is the (lagged) change of 
profit shifting from period (t-2) to (t-1). Model (2) also includes 
the lagged level of the dependent variable as a regressor to take 
into consideration cases where changes in the dependent variable 
are small. All other control variables are (lagged) changes from 
period (t-2) to (t-1). Stars, ***, **, and *, indicate significance 
levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. t-statistics, based on 
robust standard errors clustered at the subsidiary level, are reported 
in parentheses. A complete description of variables along with 
their sources is in Table 1. 
  (1) (2) 
∆ Profit shifting from t-2 to t-1 -0.010 -0.007 
 (-1.166) (-0.808) 
CSR t-1  -0.116*** 
  (-33.161) 
Δ(Var(t−2)→(t−1))   
Δ Parent ln(Total assets) 0.024*** -0.001 
 (4.978) (-0.130) 
Δ Parent leverage 0.030*** 0.032*** 
 (4.295) (4.954) 
Δ Parent ROA -0.021* -0.026** 
 (-1.788) (-2.397) 
Δ Parent Fixed assets / TA -0.039*** -0.024** 
 (-3.633) (-2.379) 
Δ Parent R&D / TA 0.683*** 0.471*** 
 (9.207) (6.887) 
Δ Subsidiary ln(Total assets) -0.002 -0.005*** 
 (-1.018) (-2.759) 
Δ Subsidiary leverage 0.000 0.002 
 (0.050) (0.632) 
Δ Subsidiary ROA -0.002 -0.001 
 (-0.433) (-0.298) 
Δ Subsidiary Fixed assets / TA 0.003 0.002 
 (0.417) (0.327) 
Δ Subsidiary R&D / TA -0.594 -0.637 
 (-1.367) (-1.484) 
Constant 0.007*** 0.095*** 
 (14.063) (32.606) 
Observations 16,965 16,965 
Adjusted R-squared 0.007 0.111 
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Table A9: Tobit model 
 
The dependent variable is profit shifting and it is calculated according to 
the method of Dharmapala and Riedel (2013) shown in equation (1). CSR 
is a parent company’s corporate social responsibility index and it is 
measured as the equal weight of three pillar scores (environmental, social, 
and governance performance). We include the following controls for both 
parent and subsidiary companies: Total assets— the natural logarithm of 
total assets, leverage— the ratio of total debt to total assets for the firm, 
ROA—a firm’s returns on assets, defined as earnings before tax divided by 
total assets, Fixed assets/TA—a firm’s asset tangibility, and R&D/TA—a 
firm’s R&D intensity. Each observation is a subsidiary firm tied to a 
foreign parent firm. Stars, ***, **, and *, indicate significance levels at the 
1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. t-statistics, based on robust standard errors 
clustered at the subsidiary level. A complete description of variables along 
with their sources is in Table 1.   
 
 Coefficient t-statistic 
CSR t-1 0.023*** 12.622 
Parent ln(Total assets) t-1 0.013*** 87.512 
Parent Leverage t-1 0.004** 2.557 
Parent ROA t-1 0.005 0.432 
Parent Fixed assets/TA t-1 -0.032*** -14.108 
Parent R&D/TA t-1 0.080*** 3.603 
Subsidiary ln(Total assets) t-1 0.002*** 7.500 
Subsidiary Leverage t-1 0.002 1.422 
Subsidiary ROA t-1 -0.014*** -4.906 
Subsidiary Fixed assets/TA t-1 -0.009*** -3.599 
Subsidiary R&D/TA t-1 -0.291*** -12.524 
Constant -0.717*** -491.419 
   
Observations 26,752 
Parent FE Yes 
Parent Industry*Year FE Yes 
Parent Country*Year FE Yes 
Subsidiary Industry*Year FE Yes 
Subsidiary Country*Year FE Yes 
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Table A10: Profit shifting measure evaluation: Profit shifting estimation using 
the true pre-tax parent earnings 
 
This table reports estimates of profit shifting based on the method developed by Dharmapala 
and Riedel (2013). The dependent variable is EBT, the natural logarithm of subsidiary’s pre-
tax profits. Low is a dummy that takes value one when the subsidiary’s tax rate is below from 
that of the parent company and zero otherwise. True pre-tax parent earnings denotes the 
parent’s pre-tax and pre-shifting earnings. Subsidiary total assets is the natural logarithm of 
subsidiary’s total assets, Subsidiary leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets for the 
subsidiary firm, Subsidiary population is the natural logarithm of the total population of the 
subsidiary’s country, and Subsidiary GDP per capita is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita 
of the subsidiary’s country. Each observation is a subsidiary firm tied to a foreign parent firm. 
Different types of fixed effects are utilized in each regression. Industry-year fixed effects are 
based on 2-digit NACE level. Country-year fixed effects are fixed effects for the subsidiary’s 
country. Stars, ***, **, and *, indicate significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
t-statistics, based on robust standard errors clustered at the subsidiary level, are reported in 
parentheses. A complete description of variables along with their sources is in Table 1. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Low (x) True pre-tax parent earnings 
0.037*** 0.035*** 0.039*** 0.037*** 
(3.629) (3.452) (3.760) (3.425) 
Low -0.406*** -0.400*** -0.442*** -0.477*** 
 (-3.053) (-3.003) (-3.245) (-3.414) 
True parent profits 0.008 0.013 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.830) (1.274) (0.137) (-0.127) 
Subsidiary total assets 0.759*** 0.772*** 0.767*** 0.762*** 
 (48.157) (48.169) (47.020) (45.835) 
Subsidiary  leverage -0.385*** -0.395*** -0.391*** -0.388*** 
 (-15.572) (-15.877) (-15.620) (-15.277) 
Subsidiary  population -1.345*** -0.504 -0.574  
 (-4.093) (-1.278) (-1.398)  
Subsidiary  GDP per capita 0.084** 0.118** 0.082  
 (1.973) (2.268) (1.527)  
     
Observations 38,725 38,725 38,526 38,484 
Adjusted R-squared 0.822 0.822 0.824 0.824 
Subsidiary effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects No Yes No No 
Industry-year effects No No Yes Yes 
Country-year effects No No No Yes 
Country-pair-year effects No No No No 
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Table A11: Profit shifting measure evaluation: Impact of CSR on 
modified profit shifting measure  
(baseline specification) 
 
The dependent variable is profit shifting and it is calculated according to the method of 
Dharmapala and Riedel (2013) shown in equation (1) using the true pre-tax parent 
earnings, 𝜋, instead of ?̃?. CSR is a parent company’s corporate social responsibility 
index and it is measured as the equal weight of three pillar scores (environmental, 
social, and governance performance). We include the following controls for both parent 
and subsidiary companies: Total assets— the natural logarithm of total assets, 
leverage— the ratio of total debt to total assets for the firm, ROA—a firm’s returns on 
assets, defined as earnings before tax divided by total assets, Fixed assets/TA—a firm’s 
asset tangibility, and R&D/TA—a firm’s R&D intensity. Each observation is a 
subsidiary firm tied to a foreign parent firm. Different types of fixed effects are utilized 
in each regression. Industry-year fixed effects are based on 2-digit NACE level. 
Country-year fixed effects are fixed effects for the subsidiary’s country. Stars, ***, **, 
and *, indicate significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. t-statistics, 
based on robust standard errors clustered at the subsidiary level, are reported in 
parentheses. A complete description of variables along with their sources is in Table 1.   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CSR t-1 0.044*** 0.038*** 0.043*** 0.037*** 
 (3.256) (2.775) (3.163) (2.704) 
Parent ln(Total assets) t-1  0.009*  0.009* 
  (1.771)  (1.658) 
Parent Leverage t-1  0.001  0.000 
  (0.047)  (0.036) 
Parent ROA t-1  0.049**  0.051** 
  (2.078)  (2.162) 
Parent Fixed assets/TA t-1  -0.046***  -0.045*** 
  (-2.948)  (-2.877) 
Parent R&D/TA t-1  0.246**  0.234** 
  (2.302)  (2.184) 
Subsidiary ln(Total assets) t-1   0.003* 0.003* 
   (1.793) (1.782) 
Subsidiary Leverage t-1   0.001 0.001 
   (0.239) (0.243) 
Subsidiary ROA t-1   -0.012 -0.012 
   (-1.108) (-1.119) 
Subsidiary Fixed assets/TA t-1   -0.013 -0.013 
   (-1.587) (-1.577) 
Subsidiary R&D/TA t-1   -0.348** -0.346** 
   (-1.999) (-1.988) 
     
Observations 25,376 25,376 25,376 25,376 
Adjusted R-squared 0.742 0.742 0.742 0.742 
Parent FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Parent Industry*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Parent Country*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Subsidiary Industry*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Subsidiary Country*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
